Particular Intentions : The Hillmon Case and the Supreme Court by Wesson, Marianne
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
2006 
"Particular Intentions": The Hillmon Case and the Supreme Court 
Marianne Wesson 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Evidence Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States 
Commons 
Citation Information 
Marianne Wesson, "Particular Intentions": The Hillmon Case and the Supreme Court, 18 LAW & LITERATURE 
343 (2006), available at https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/381. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
Citation: 18 Law & Literature 343 2006 
Provided by: 
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Mar 28 16:12:46 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
"Particular Intentions"
THE HILLMON CASE AND THE SUPREME COURT
Marianne Wesson*
Abstract. The case ofMutual Life Insurance Company v. Hillmon is one of the most influential
decisions in the law of evidence. Decided by the Supreme Court in 1892, it invented an exception to
the hearsay rle for statements encompassing the intentions of the declarant. But this exception
seems not to rest on anyplausible theory of the categorical reliability ofsuch statements. This article
suggests that the case turned instead on the Court's attachment to a particular narrative about the
events that gave rise to the case, events that produced a corpse of disputed identity. The author's
investigations into newspaper archives and the original case documents make the case for a different
account, and propose that this important rule of evidence may have grown out ofa historical error,
committed by a Court too eager to narrate an attractive story.
Every lawsuit begins and ends as a story, and sometimes it's even a really
ripping tale, teeming with plot, character, and suspense. But the law's insis-
tence on distillation and abstraction ensures that ordinarily a casual student
of the lawsuit, reading an appellate opinion, can catch only fleeting and
sometimes misleading glimpses of the story. The narrative movement in
legal scholarship has attempted, among its other projects, to excavate some
of the stories thus concealed.' This article gives an account of one such
undertaking, and its unexpected discovery that the narrative urge and an
inauthentic document-a fake-may have made a significant and ironic
contribution to the evolution of the law of evidence.
In the spring of 1879, a young Kansas woman named Sallie Hillmon2 filed
claims against the policies that three insurance companies had issued on the life of
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John Hillmon, her husband of six months. John had died, she said, in a firearms
accident at a campsite in rural southwest Kansas. Life insurance fraud was
common in late nineteenth century America,3 and the companies refused to pay
the claims, maintaining that her husband was not dead. In July of 188o,
negotiations broke down and she commenced lawsuits against them. The case4 was
tried six times, and twice received plenary consideration on appeal by the United
States Supreme Court. The narrative aspects of the Hillmon case have not been
altogether neglected: because Mrs. Hillmon was a young woman, innocent of
apparent influence or connections, and because the insurers were powerful eastern
corporations, in its time the Hillmon case was regarded as an entertaining David-
and-Goliath struggle and a contest between teams of celebrity lawyers.' But
among litigators and law students, the case is chiefly remembered today because in
the course of considering the trial court's exclusion of certain epistolary evidence,
the Supreme Court created the important "state of mind" exception to the hearsay
rule for expressions of the intentions of the speaker or writer. In practice this rule
has, like all persisting legal doctrines, become somewhat abstracted from the case
that gave it birth. Yet in many ways it remains profoundly wedded to its origins in
a dispute about the identity of the corpse found at the campground, and thus
embedded in a classic mystery narrative.
The Hillmon decision has proven one of the most durable examples of
nineteenth-century case law. Many decisions of that era concerning the rules of
evidence enjoy little continuing vitality, in part because they often have a vague
or ipse dixit quality to them,6 but Hillmon is different: cited as the basis of one of
the hearsay exceptions codified in 1975 by the Federal Rules of Evidence, its
facts parsed and studied by lawyers bent on persuading judges that its
precedent should be viewed in one way or the other, it is a case that every
student of evidence, every trial lawyer, and every judge knows and remembers.
The state of mind exception, at least as it pertains to expressions of intention,
rests on very little ground other than the authority of Hillmon; more than
nearly any other rule of evidence, it owes its existence to a single decision.
The subject of the Court's opinion was the admissibility, over a hearsay
objection, of a certain letter. Ostensibly written by a young man to his
sweetheart back home, the letter is an object that a student of film theory might
call the McGuffin.7 Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon held that this
particular McGuffin was admissible, happily for the story that could not
satisfactorily be told without it, and there is no denying that it is an altogether
shapely and rewarding tale. But it will be my claim here that the story as
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conventionally understood is not true, and its McGuffin was not an authentic
document at all, but a fake. I will argue that the narrative exigencies of the
story it felt compelled to tell led the Court to create an ill-considered but
remarkably resilient legal doctrine, and that the venerability and importance
of this doctrine have led us to remember the events-the story--of the
Hillmon case in a way that validates the Court's enterprise of rule invention,
but cannot survive a closer inquiry into the historical record. Altogether, the
Hillmon matter serves as a beautiful illustration of the influence that certain
narrative imperatives may bring to bear on the creation of legal rules.
THE CORPSE AT THE CAMPGROUND
The Hillmon case was tried twice, in 1882 and 1885, to juries that were unable
to decide on a unanimous verdict. It was a verdict for Sallie Hillmon in the
third trial, in 1888, that eventuated in the famous Supreme Court decision of
1892.8 The ultimate contested factual issue in all of the trials was the identity
of a man who died at a campsite on Crooked Creek, near Medicine Lodge, Kansas,
leaving behind a body whose demise far predated the availability of twentieth-
century methods for the identification of biological material. Sallie Hillmon
and her attorneys insisted that the corpse was her husband's, and there was
evidence that this was the case, including identifications of the body (when it
was fresher) by Sallie Hillmon and many of those who knew Hillmon when he
was alive9, and statements made on some occasions by Hillmon's traveling
companion at the time, John H. Brown. In Brown's original account, as well as
in his later pretrial deposition, he said he had shot Hillmon accidentally while
unloading a firearm from a wagon while the two men were camped near the
place called Crooked Creek.0
The insurance companies argued that the deceased was not Hillmon,
whom they accused of absconding in the service of an insurance swindle, but
an innocent victim, a man whom they claimed Hillmon and John H. Brown
had lured to Crooked Creek for the precise purpose of killing him and leaving
his body behind to be passed off as Hillmon's. There was some evidence that
th is was the case, including witnesses who swore the body (or a photograph of
it) could not have been Hillmon, " and a written statement sworn to by John H.
Brown on another occasion, in which he affirmed the companies' version,
saying that the victim was an individual named "Joe" whom he and Hillmon
had picked up in Wichita and persuaded to accompany them west. 2
345
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Other evidence adduced by the defendants in the various trials included
testimony from several persons who identified the dead man as Frederick
Adolph Walters, once a citizen of Ft. Madison, Iowa, and the betrothed of a
Miss Alvina Kasten, also of Ft. Madison. 3 It was not disputed that Mr. Walters
had left Ft. Madison in March of 1878 for the purpose of bettering his condition,
and had traveled widely in the Midwest for a year or so. The defendant
insurance companies claimed that Walters found himself in Wichita in March
of 18791", and it is here that the McGuffin, or letter, comes into the story.
Indeed it was claimed in the third trial that there had been two letters from
Mr. Walters posted from Wichita to Ft. Madison in early March of 1879, one to
Miss Kasten and the other to Mr. Walters' sister Elizabeth Rieffenach, although
the Rieffenach letter was, in fact, never produced. 5 In the first two trials (as
well as in the last three) the Kasten letter was received as an exhibit, supported
by the pretrial deposition testimony of Miss Kasten about her receipt of it.'6
Mrs. Rieffenach, the sister of the missing man, claimed that the letter she had
received from her brother could not be found, and in some of the trials her
rather remarkably detailed testimony concerning its contents was allowed. 7
The contents of the two missives varied in a fashion one might expect
considering the writer's relationships to the addressees, but according to the
testimony and evidence each letter informed the recipient that the author was in
Wichita but planned to leave that city soon with a "man by the name of
Hillmon" (in the sister's account of her letter, "a certain Mr. Hillmon"). The
letters described Hillmon as a sheep trader, and the fiancee's letter explained
the writer's decision to accompany this stranger, rather than follow many other
young men of the time west to the Colorado mines in search of gold, with the
revelation that Hillmon had "promised me more wages than I could make at
anything else." Each of the women described her respective letter as the last
communication she had ever enjoyed from Mr. Walters. 8
These letters were obviously useful to the defense, both in suggesting an
alternate identity for the corpse and in corroborating Brown's statement that he
and Hillmon had lured a victim to accompany them on their journey. It's difficult
for any reader of the Court's 1892 decision to resist the conviction aroused by Mr.
Justice Gray's description of the letters-that the Crooked Creek corpse
belonged to Frederick Adolph Walters. It's nearly impossible to regard as
coincidence that Frederick Adolph Walters, shortly before the death at the
campground, encountered a man named Hillmon in Wichita, left that town with
him, and was never heard from again; murder is the obvious explanation.
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Yet the first two juries were unconvinced of murder, at least enough of the
jurors to produce two mistrials. The third jury, however, pondered a different
mix of evidence: in that trial Sallie's lawyers apparently realized for the first time
that the Kasten letter and the testimony of Elizabeth Rieffenach about the one
she said she had received were hearsay, and made appropriate objections. Judge
Shiras of the Circuit Court in Topeka sustained the objections and barred
mention of either letter. 9 The jury, thus unaware of the letters, returned a verdict
for Mrs. Hillmon, and the insurance companies appealed. The Supreme Court's
decision overturning that verdict contains its famous language about what has
become known as the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule.
THE BIRTH OF THE STATE OF MIND EXCEPTION
The language from the Court's opinion that has been remembered (and codi-
fied) is this:
The existence of a particular intention in a certain person at a certain time being
a material fact to be proved, evidence that expressed that intention at that time
is as direct evidence of that face, as his own testimony that he then had that
intention would be.... The letters in question were competent not as narratives
of facts communicated to the writer by others, nor yet as proof that he actually
went away from Wichita, but as evidence that, shortly before the time when
other evidence tended to show that he went away, he had the intention of going,
and of going with Hillmon, which made it more probable both that he did go
and that he went with Hillmon than if there had been no proof of such intention.
In view of the mass of conflicting testimony introduced upon the question
whether it was the body of Walters that was found in Hillmon's camp, this evi-
dence might properly influence the jury in determining that question.
The rule applicable to this case has been thus stated by this court: "Wher-
ever the bodily or mental feelings of an individual are material to be proved, the
usual expressions of such feelings are original and competent evidence. Those
expressions are the natural reflexes of what it might be impossible to show by
other testimony. If there be such other testimony, this may be necessary to set
the facts thus developed in their true light, and to give them their proper effect.
As independent, explanatory, or corroborative evidence it is often indispensable
to the due administration of justice. Such declarations are regarded as verbal
acts, and are as competent as any other testimony, when relevant to the issue.
Their truth or falsity is an inquiry for the jury.""0
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With this reasoning the Court reversed the trial judge and sent the case
back to be tried anew, directing that the evidence of the two letters be
allowed. The Court's language is scarcely transparent, however, espe-
cially to the eye of a reader a century later. What does the Court mean
when it suggests that expressions of intention are (at least sometimes)
"verbal acts"? Today we reserve that description for utterances the saying
of which per se transforms the legal situation of the speaker and/or
another-for example words of gift, of contract, or of consent.2' It is char-
acteristic of such locutions that they effect this transformation whether or
not they are "true"; they are not actually hearsay at all, because they are
not offered to prove the truth of some matter asserted." Descriptions of
one's intention to go to a certain place are not, ordinarily, in that cate-
gory-certainly not when offered solely as proof that the person did go to
that place. Such declarations would be probative only if true-would be,
that is, hearsay. The Court spreads this confusion around a bit by borrow-
ing from an earlier case the proposition that the "truth or falsity" of state-
ments like those in the letters is "an inquiry for the jury."23 But the rule
excluding hearsay, which the Court does not purport to repeal in this case
or any other, rests precisely on the notion that the truth or falsity of some
extrajudicial utterances is too challenging for the determination of a jury
that has been deprived of a chance to observe the declarant and hear him
cross-examined under oath.
What could account for the Court's unconvincing reasoning and doubtful
rulemaking in the Hillmon case? Even a modest version of the hearsay
exception for the expressed intentions of a hearsay declarant, that is a version
allowing expressions of intention to prove only the genuineness of the
intention, does not rest on any plausible theory of reliability; it lacks any
justification in the sort of armchair psychology that prompted the invention
of, say, the exceptions for dying declarations24 or statements against interest.2"
On the contrary, it would seem to be easier to lie about one's intentions than
about nearly anything else, since the likelihood of being caught out in a lie is
small-any discovery of later acts incompatible with the expressed intention
can always be explained by the simple phrase "I changed my mind." The more
robust version of the exception endorsed by the Hillmon court is even less
grounded in reliability, since allowing an expression of intention as evidence
that the intention was accomplished disregards the folk wisdom that there is
"many a slip 'twixt cup and lip."'"
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One could ascribe the Court's curious misstep here to generalized hostility
toward Sallie Hillmon and her suit.2 But the Court did not need to reach out to
invent the state of mind exception to send Mrs. Hillmon's case back for retrial;
it had already decided, before addressing the matter of the Walters letters, that
Judge Shiras erred reversibly by granting the insurance company defendants
too few peremptory challenges. 2 Indeed, the dispute about the letters seems to
have been a secondary consideration in the minds of the defendants' lawyers.
The companies' principal argument before the Court concerned the peremp-
tor , challenge question, and they placed the matter of the letters far down their
list of assigned errors." Nevertheless, after disposing rather briskly of the
challenge issue, the Court observed that "[t]here is... one question of evidence
so important, so fully argued at the bar, and so likely to arise upon another trial,
that it is proper to express an opinion on it,"" and then proceeded to consider
the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of the Walters letters. There were
many other points of error assigned by the insurance companies in their appeal,
not a few of which were equally likely to "arise upon another trial," but it was
the hearsay question that the Court chose to address.
The Court's general pro-business orientation during the i88o's and 1890's
might be suspected of playing a role in the Hillmon decision, but it does not
seem likely that the Hillmon decision arose entirely from the Court's pro-
capitalist impulse. The creation of a new exception to the hearsay rule was not
ex ante a victory for business, except in this one case; in the future, this novel
doctrine was as likely to be employed by an individual litigant, or the
government, as by a business organization.
If puzzled, we may be enlightened a bit by one available source of direct
information about the Court's thinking in the Hillmon matter. Justice Horace
Gray, who wrote the opinion of the Court, had at the time a remarkably
competent secretary (today we would say law clerk): Ezra Ripley Thayer, later to
become Dean of the Harvard Law School and a noted evidence teacher and
scholar. In Dean Thayer's teaching notes he recounts that, con-trary to the
Court's description of the matter as "fully argued at the bar," the case for
admitting the hearsay letters was "miserably argued."'" The companies' counsel,
he reports, put forward "practically no ground" except course of business-that
is, the business records exception. Justice Gray's opinion also notes that the
insurance companies' counsel had rested their argument for the admissibility of
the letters chiefly on this exception, one he dismisses immediately as profoundly
unsuited to the Walters correspondence. According to Thayer, the Court in
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conference nevertheless voted to overturn the trial court's ruling on "general
principles."32 In any event, Thayer noted that Justice Gray, assigned to write the
opinion, was in "dense darkness" until he (Thayer) "fed him with matter
obtained with J.B.T."' 33-that is, from James Bradley Thayer, the young
secretary's father, himself a scholar of the law of evidence at Harvard.
At the time the Hillmon case was argued, it seems the Supreme Court
building housed a Court that would object to the exclusion of the letters on
principles too general to be articulated but too powerful to be omitted from its
holding, a Justice assigned to author an opinion but more than willing to leave
the fine points to his clerk, and a young scholar so eager to leave his mark on
the law of evidence that he would seek guidance in exparte correspondence
with his famous father, incorporate their invention into the Court's opinion,
and later boast that it was his idea, and not the clueless Justice Gray's, to
cobble together this new exception to the hearsay rule.
And yet these converging antagonists to Sallie Hillmon's victory, who
suffered from no apparent motives more nefarious than ordinary ambition or
professional fatigue, cannot altogether account for the invention of the state of
mind exception. There is something more powerful at work: the urge to
complete a just and intelligible narrative. One proponent of narrative legal
theory proposes the maxim Da mihifacta, abo tibi us ("give me the facts, then
I will give you the law"),34 and several scholars have remarked the inseparable
character of the activities of law-making and fact-finding (or storytelling).3"
Persuaded by these accounts, I believe that narrative exigencies, rather than
any policy views regarding the advisability of a hearsay exception for
statements of intention, drove the Court's 1892 decision in the Hillmon case.
There is even a narrative tradition in which the story as it was understood
by the Court-that is, the story of Hillmon's criminality and Walters'
victimization-would fall: that of the romance. The appeal of this variety of
narrative has been persuasively identified by Robin West with natural law
jurisprudence,36 a system of thought that would have informed the
jurisprudential inclinations of many members of the Supreme Court in 1892." 7
West relies on the analytic categories explicated by Northrop Frye, who
instructs that in romance, "subtlety and complexity are not much favored.
Characters tend to be either for or against the quest. If they assist it they are
idealized as gallant or pure; if they obstruct it they are characterized as
villainous or cowardly."38 Frye also suggests that in romance, "[t]he enemy is
associated with winter, darkness, confusion, sterility, moribund life, and old
age, and the hero with spring, dawn, order, fertility, vigor, and youth."39
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On the dimension of comedy and tragedy, the Court's implicit narrative
tends toward the comic, which according to Frye "celebrates the virtue of the
dominant social group" and "protects the group against assault from
outsiders."4 Of course, insurance companies are not very plausible romantic
heroes, which may explain why the defendants put so much stock in the
Walters theory: a young adventurer seeking his fortune away from home
while trying to maintain ties to his betrothed and family can be portrayed as a
perfect gentle knight. The resulting narrative is nearly irresistible, especially
to a Court already inclined toward natural law.
Then there is the circumstance that the crucial piece of evidence was a letter.
From Poe's purloined letter to the "letters of transit" in Casablanca, the epistle has
played a central role in the American narrative tradition. In American and British
literature and popular culture letters were sometimes emblematic of intrigue or
deception, but that was because their seal permitted intimate disclosures between
correspondents. Rarely were they depicted as carriers of falsehood; more often,
the receipt or discovery of a letter and the truth it tells explains what has been a
mystery (for example, Darcy's behavior toward Wickham in Pride and
Prejudice). Either they have an instrumental use unrelated to any proposition they
convey, like "letters of transit"; or letters are concealed sources of (sometimes
unwelcome) truth, like Poe's letter, which (we are given to understand) is
incriminating to its owner precisely because of its candor and intimacy.
Thus in both popular and literary understanding at the time of the Hillmon
case, letters were artless documents unlikely to contain lies.4' And unless the
reader forces herself into an attitude of doubt about its authenticity, the
"Dearest Alvina" letter that the Court found so convincing (and
consequently, as I believe, so plainly admissible) seems artless in the extreme.
From its unstudied grammar ("There is so many folks in this country that
have got the Leadville fever, and if I would not have got the situation that I
have now, I would of went there myself") to its clumsy expressions of
affection ("When I get back you will get to see me in about the same way we
parted (you bet)"), the document appears to be devoid of contrivance.
Moroever, it is not just any missive, but a love letter, or billet-doux-that is,
intended for no one's eyes except Miss Kasten's and unlikely to be seen by any
other reader. In such an intimate piece of correspondence, what would be the
point of a falsehood about having met "a man by the name of Hillmon"?
(Probably these musings are what the Court meant by its allusion to
"circumstances precluding a suspicion of misrepresentation.")
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Of course, any doubt about the authenticity of the letter might spoil its
appearance of transparency, but none was raised by Sallie Hillmon's lawyers.
Elated, as well they might have been, by their tardy realization that the letter
was hearsay (and not admissible by any exception to the rule recognized at the
time) they seem to have placed all of their energy into defending its exclusion
on those grounds.
The Court that decided Hillmon was not interpreting a statute or a
Constitution; it was unconstrained by any text whatsoever. The rules of evi-
dence were commonly invented by judges, case by case, and at the time there
were no critics suggesting that this enterprise partook of "judicial activism" or
any other questionable philosophy. Inattentive though they may have been to
the details of their decision, the Justices must have believed they were doing
justice by inventing a hearsay exception for statements describing the
intentions of the speaker. For truth to prevail (and for Hillmon's swindle to be
thwarted), the letters had to be part of the story; for the letters to be part of the
story, they had to be admissible; for the letters (unquestionably hearsay) to be
admissible, some exception to the hearsay rule had to be found; if one could
not be found, it must be invented. Da mihifacta, abo tibi ius.
HILLIMON'S ICONIC PERSISTENCE
More than judicial narrative anxiety is required, however, to explain the veneration
that the Hillmon doctrine has encountered over the ensuing years, for not all nine-
teenth-century decisions concerning the law of evidence have so impressively
endured, nor been so generously interpreted. Yet here as well, narrative theory
has a contribution to make. The Hillmon story, with its familiar motifs (popu-
lism, corporate greed, wily frontier drifters, hardscrabble lives made bearable by
the possibility of windfall wealth, the sudden production of a document to end
disputes among contesting eyewitnesses), is a candidate for the status Jonathan
Yovell has called "invisible precedent."42 As with Yovell's example, the murder
of a fellow gambler by the brutal Englishman Thurtell, the narrative itself is so
engaging and so resonant that the mere invocation of it enhances the prestige of
subsequent productions. In literature or other cultural environments, this pro-
cess represents the ordinary progress of culture. But if the later artifacts are legal
productions-that is, decisions or rules the citation of the original may suc-
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ceed in substituting the narrative virtues of the source for reasoned analysis.
Thus do good stories become law, or pieces of law-although the features that
make the stories good ones may not necessarily survive the transformation, and
excellent narratives may metamorphize into bad laws.
The role the Hillmon case played in the formation of one of the Federal
Rules of Evidence exemplifies this process. Although later commentators
raised doubts about the rule of Hillmon, especially the expansive version,43 its
holding was incorporated 83 years after its announcement into Rule 803(3).
That rule, demarking an exception to the hearsay rule, reads (in pertinent part):
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant
is available as a witness: .... A statement of the declarant's then existing state of
mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive,
design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed ....
By itself (especially in light of the qualification of the last phrase) this rule
might be read to exclude such materials as the Walters letters, or at least to
require strict confinement of their use to proving the intentions of the
declarant, and prohibit their employment to prove any past acts, or anyone
else's intentions. But it has not on the whole been read that way, in part
because the influential Advisory Committee's Note to that rule states: "The
rule of MutualLife Insurance Co. v. Hillmon,.. ., allowing evidence of inten-
tion as tending to prove the doing of the act intended is, of course, left undis-
turbed."'
Note the emphatic of course deployed in the midst of the comment.
Although other Advisory Committee Notes are thoughtful, analytical,
occasionally critical-even of Supreme Court precedents4 5 -in this Note
the mere mention, the invocation, of Hillmon begins and ends the
discussion. The case has become iconic, and thus unquestionable.
Moreover, the cause of narrative coherence requires that its rule must be
construed to sustain the story of deception and conspiracy that the case is
understood to tell. The letters must, in this cause, be admissible in all of
their aspects and implications-they must illuminate not only what
Walters intended and did, but also what Hillmon intended and did. Unless
the letters are allowed this explanatory force, the story is missing essential
ingredients that are required to satisfy our curiosity and our hunger for a
just narrative.
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AN ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVE
Suppose a case were to be made for the truth of quite a different narrative, one
in which the corpse belongs to Hillmon after all? In particular, suppose that
the story's McGuffins, the famous letters, were fakes, or (in the case of the
Rieffenach letter) never existed? The possibility of any such plausible narra-
tive may seem small given all of the foregoing discussion, but that is in part
because the authenticity of the Walters letters is taken for granted; the quarrel
over their admissibility as hearsay seems to have exhausted any skepticism
about their provenance on the part of Mrs. Hillmon's lawyers. It is also in part
because partisans of the defendants have played a suspiciously large role in
constructing the Hillmon story in historical memory.
Most persons familiar with the Hillmon case take their understanding of it
from a few sources: the Supreme Court's opinion, a 1925 Harvard Law
Review article by John MacArthur Maguire entitled The Hillmon Case.- Thirty-
Three Years After;" and a lengthy account of the case found in the 1913 edition
of Dean Wignore's famous treatise on the law of evidence, The Principles of
Judicial Proof." Those more historically inclined might search out an article
by historian Brooks W. Maccracken, published in American Heritage magazine
in 1968.48 Although the Maguire article is somewhat critical of the apparent
breadth of the Hillmon doctrine, in none of these accounts would the reader
find much to disturb her impression that the exclusion of the Walters letters
would have been a hindrance to discovering the true identity of the corpse at
Crooked Creek. Lovers of truth, and those attached to the idea that the rules
of evidence on the whole promote its realization, will find little to disturb them
in their consideration of the Hillmon case if it rests on these sources.
But these accounts, especially the Wigmore excerpt, are subject to a certain
amount of impeachment when examined alongside more contemporaneous
documents. Maccracken, author of the' engaging American Heritage article,
confesses that his "principal authority" was a report he says was prepared by
the Kansas State Superintendent of Insurance; this is the same account that is
republished in the Wigmore treatise.49 Although Maccracken acknowledges
that the individual who authored the report was "of counsel for the insurance
companies in the second trial," he does not seem to consider that this
circumstance might have affected the reliability of the account."5
In fact the author of this report, which was written after the third trial had
resulted in a verdict for Mrs. Hillmon but before the Supreme Court had
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rendered its decision," was not the Superintendent of Insurance at all, but a
lawyer and businessman named Charles Gleed. Not merely "of counsel," he
was attorney of record for the defendant insurance companies in both the
second and third trials of the Hillmon case." Newspaper accounts and court
records confirm that he and his firm continued to represent one of the
insurance companies for the next decade, through the last trial. Apparently
Gleed, who had no official connection to the Department of Insurance,
succeeded in inserting his (naturally) adversarial account of the Hillmon case
into the report issued that year by the actual Superintendent, 3 Daniel W.
Wilder, and then somehow deceived the great Dean Wigmore into believing
that the document had a more unbiased origin. (Wigmore acknowledges that
his source for the document was "a typewritten copy ... supplied for use in
this work by the courtesy of Mr. Gleed.")54
Gleed was not only attorney for the companies, but also a journalist who
claims to have written many of the contemporaneous newspaper accounts of
the inquest and the first trial.55 He practically made a career of debunking
Mrs. Hillmon's claim, and yet his account has become the principal authority
for what we now remember of, and how we think about, the Hillmon case.
THE NEWSPAPERS AND THE HILLMON CASE
The Hillmon case was a sensation, and the Kansas press of that time was never
objective in its coverage. But this is not to say that newspaper accounts about
trials were indifferent to facts. Indeed, the daily stories in many papers resem-
bled transcripts, with minute, almost question-and-answer, reportage of the
testimony. Stories often began with recapitulations of earlier days' testimony,
and these introductions offered the reporter an opportunity for summary,
analysis, and opinion. Some of the papers that reported the Hillmon trials
were obvious Hillmon partisans, and some (especially the Leavenworth Times)
obvious allies of the insurance companies.
Newspaper accounts, when factual and not partisan, may be used to fill
gaps in official court records. Although portions of the transcripts of the third
and sixth trials have been preserved in the records prepared for appeal, these
records did not include transcriptions of every witness's testimony. As for the
four inconclusive trials, no official transcripts are available. Moreover, the first
three judicial inquiries into the death at Crooked Creek were coroner's
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inquests, and transcripts of their proceedings have not been preserved,56 but
the third, and most consequential, inquest is reported in extraordinary detail
by the Lawrence Standard. Many of the witnesses who testified at the six later
trials gave testimony at the Lawrence inquest, and some of the jurors later
became witnesses in the various trials. In addition, the circumstance that an
inquest was held in Lawrence at all, after one had been concluded in the
county where the body was found, is not without interest. To begin to
understand the Hillmon case, it is necessary to begin with the inquests.
THE INQUESTS AND THE "CALCIUM LIGHT OF TRUTH"
After Brown reported the shooting death at Crooked Creek, two inquests
were conducted under the auspices of the coroner at nearby Medicine Lodge,
seat of rural Barbour County. The first jury failed to agree whether the death
was accident or otherwise (one account says the jury "did not know how to
render a verdict,"57 an odd circumstance suggesting that homicide, or at least
investigations into it, were not common in Barbour County); the second con-
cluded that the shooting was accidental." The body was then buried at Medicine
Lodge, and Brown wrote a letter to Sallie Hillmon explaining what had hap-
pened and conveying his regret and condolences.59
When the insurance companies that had issued policies on Hillmon's life
learned of the reported death, however, they lost no time moving into
action. Agents of two of the companies, Theodore Wiseman (sometimes
known by the title of "Major")" and a C. Tillinghast, traveled to Medicine
Lodge and demanded that the body be exhumed for their examination.
They were accompanied by one Colonel Walker, apparently a figure of
some renown in Kansas.6 The first two gentlemen told the Medicine Lodge
coroner that they knew Hillmon and wanted to assure themselves that the
deceased was he. According to a contemporaneous report in The Medicine
Lodge paper, the Cresset, "the identification was satisfactory" and the body,
presumptively Hillmon's, was dispatched "to be returned to his relatives
near Lawrence."62 When the body reached Lawrence, however, far from
being returned to Sallie Hillmon or any other relative, it was delivered to
two physicians, Doctors Smart and Walker. Described by the Lawrence
Standard as "representing the insurance companies," these physicians were
reported to be in doubt about whether the body, by then nearly a month
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dead and partially decomposed, was that of Hillmon. Three other persons
who knew Hillmon were asked to look at the exhumed body, and all said
they could not be certain whether or not it was he. Mrs. Hillmon declined at
first to examine the body, saying she preferred to remember her husband as
he was in life, but later she did look at it.63 The body was then sent to a
funeral home to be embalmed, although it was displayed to various persons
over the ensuing days.
The next day the coroner of Leavenworth County summoned a coroner's
jury and commenced a third inquest, Douglas County Attorney J.W. Green
and his assistant George Barker performing the office of examining the
witnesses. Early on the Standard's reporter took time out from describing
the testimony to castigate some cynical observers of the proceedings: "The
mistake is made by some, of supposing that the inquest now being held is
managed by the representatives of the insurance companies. The inquest is,
of course, by the State to determine whether the body brought here is that of
Hillmon, and the manner of that death. County Attorney Green and Geo. J.
Barker represent the State and not the insurance companies in the
examination now being held."6
This rather impatient admonition takes on some significance in light of later
events. Mr. Charles Gleed's role in representing the insurance companies at the
later trials of Mrs. Hilllmon's suit against them has been earlier remarked, but the
reader will perhaps be surprised to learn that his co-counsel in those trials were
J.W. Green and George J. Barker. Barker and Green also represented the
companies at the first trial, as well as in both appeals, serving these clients
altogether for nearly a quarter of a century. Green, the County Attorney, later
became Dean of the University of Kansas School of Law, although he continued
to represent the companies in the Hillmon litigation. Whatever their titles and
job descriptions at the time of the inquest, these gentlemen certainly ascended
later to precisely the roles here disclaimed for them. But it is likely that they were
actually employed by the companies even at the time of the inquest. At the
fourth trial of the case, in 1895, the Coroner (called as witness by the defendants)
testified that he had received his pay for conducting the inquest from the
insurance companies, that he believed the witnesses and jurors had been
compensated from the same source, and that "as far as he knew the coroner's
inquest had not cost the county of Douglas a single dollar."65 He also recalled
"the fact of the examination of witnesses being conducted by George J. Barker in
behalf of the insurance companies and that to this, [the Coroner] offered no
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objections." ' Testifying in the same trial, Major Wiseman corroborated this
account: he said that he had "employed Mr. Barker at the time of the inquest to
assist him in establishing the fact that the body was not Hillmon's."67
Many witnesses testified, including John Brown, who gave the same account
of an accidental shooting that he had given at Medicine Lodge.' Mrs. Hillmon
testified that she had looked at the corpse after it was brought to Lawrence and
knew it for her husband's. 9 Similar testimony about the corpse's resemblance
to Hillmon was given by Levi Baldwin, a cousin of Sallie and erstwhile
employer of John Hillmon who had gone to Medicine Lodge and accompanied
the body back to Lawrence." The proprietor of the rooming house where Sallie
and John maintained their household also said he had seen the corpse and it was
Hillmon.7' The chief controversies seemed to concern the questions of
Hillmon's height, the condition of his teeth, and the age of a smallpox
vaccination scar. (Controversies over these matters-teeth, height, scars-
would mark each of the later trials as well.) The corpse was five-eleven, and
Hillmon had reported exactly that height when he first applied for the
insurance, but the doctor who examined him at the time testified that Hillmon
had come back a few days later to say that he was really only five-nine, and that
the doctor had then proceeded to measure him and found that the shorter
height was correct.7 ' Hillmon had been vaccinated for smallpox just before
leaving on his journey, about three and a half weeks before the shooting, and
the corpse had a scar from a recent vaccination, but various doctors testified
that the scar was too fresh for the body to be Hillmon's. 7 ' The physicians who
had performed the post-mortem of the corpse noted its excellent teeth and one
of them, who had examined Hillmon in connection with his policy application,
said that by contrast "one or two" of Hillmon's front teeth were "broken or
out. 7 4 Levi Baldwin and the Hillmons' landlord Arthur Judson, however, said
that John Hillmon's teeth were not defective, and one of the other physicians
said he had noticed nothing unusual about Hillmon's teeth when he examined
him.71 Two of the physicians also disputed an aspect of John Brown's account of
the shooting: a man shot as the dead man had been would not have staggered
before falling, as Brown said Hillmon had, but would, as one of them opined,
fall "like a dead weight," or "quick as sight.1
7
The reaction from afar to this medical testimony by the writers and editors
of the Medicine Lodge Cresset (which had earlier reported on the finding of the
corpse and the less elaborate coroner's proceedings in that city) was swift and
venomous. Reminding their readers of the earlier events, they wrote:
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And now come forward divers and sundry medical experts, versed in the
intricacies of insurance swindling, and propose to choke down our throat
the monstrous falsehood, that Mrs. Sadie E. Hillman and the man J.H.
Brown are accomplices in a matter of selling human life and human blood
for money. The legal and medical twisting shows an evident strain on the
part of the Insurance departments to establish, by quack doctors, old
women and hack drivers, that Hillman was not Hillman, but that some poor
unfortunate soul has been sent to eternity, and his body made to do duty as
dead man in Hillman's boots.77
The Cresset's writers speculated that suspicions had attached to the Hillmon
death in part because it took place in their rural neighborhood, which they
claimed city folk had always regarded as an uncouth wilderness "where the
Lion roareth and the Whangdoodle mourneth for its first born."7 "
But back in Lawrence the reporting continued for a time to be less obviously
opinionated. When the reporter departed from mere transcription, in the early
stages of the trial his analysis was notably evenhanded. He characterized
Brown's testimony as "a seeming consistent, fair, and honest story."79 He noted
the oddity of a man like Hillmon purchasing a large amount of life insurance
(apparently the same circumstance that aroused the insurance companies'
suspicions), but then conceded that "a man in such circumstances, if he was
going into a wild, frontier country, and leaving behind a loved wife, might take
that amount and carry it, for a time, at least."' And though he noted the
discrepancy between the corpse's length and the five feet nine inches of Hillmon
height measured the preceding winter (by the doctor's testimony), asking "does
lying in the grave three weeks lengthen a man out in that way?", he also
observed that "in many cases death and decomposition work wonderful changes
in a human body, so that it cannot be recognized even by longtime friends who
have known and loved the form when it was animated with life."81
John Brown had, in his testimony, mentioned that a third man had traveled
with him and Hillmon from a spot "a few miles" out of Wichita to a creek
"seven or eight miles" from that city, where the man, whose name they did not
learn, camped with them two or three days before joining another party.82 He
also mentioned that a different stranger had camped with them for one night
near (but not at) the fatal Crooked Creek campsite.83 But nobody to this point
sought to put a name other than Hillmon's on the corpse, nor was it suggested
that either of the traveling companions Brown mentioned might have ended
up dead at Crooked Creek.
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Apparently some citizens who were following the affair continued to
complain that the coroner in Douglas County had no business reopening the
question of manner of death after it had been disposed of in Barbour County. 4
The Standard's reporter had no sympathy at all for this opinion:
The attempt to belittle the case is, of course, a failure. A human life was sacri-
ficed under such circumstances that it becomes the duty of the proper authori-
ties to thoroughly investigate the matter. It is know that the Coroner's inquest in
Barbour County was a harried and ignorantly-managed affair.
According to Levi Baldwin's own testimony, the first coroner's jury sum-
moned in Barbour County did not know how to render a verdict, and another
was summoned, and after a brief and hasty consideration of the matter, based
entirely on Brown's testimony, gave a verdict of accidental killing. Subsequent
facts that came to light, rendering it absolutely imperative that the strange and
unaccountable performance that caused the death of a citizen of Douglas county
(or a purported citizen) should be thoroughly looked into, and every fact con-
nected with it brought to the surface, so that the calcium light of truth may shine
in upon what seems to be a cowardly and murderous transaction. If all parties
are innocent, no one should object to an investigation, and those who do object
to it may find themselves upon the side of thieves and murderers. 5
Despite the mildness of his earlier reporting, one may mark here the moment
where the Standard's journalist, as if stung by the sentiments of those who
questioned the propriety of the proceedings, changes his tone from curiosity
to active hostility toward Sallie Hillmon's claim.
Moreover, at just about this time, this reporter undertook some inves-
tigation of his own. He wrote
Before proceeding to a synopsis of today's testimony in the Brown-Hillmon
case, which is now attracting very general attention, we desire to say that this
reporter called on a lady who had seen Hillmon and particularly noticed his fea-
tures, and the following conversation took place:
"When did you see Hillmon?"
"Shortly after his marriage, at a social gathering. He played with my baby, and I
noticed him particularly, as the man made an unfavorable impression upon me."
"Did you notice any peculiarity of feature about him?"
"I did. His upper lip ran up in the center and displayed his front teeth, and one
or two of the teeth were partly broken off or gone. I always notice a person's
teeth."86
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Having delivered this bombshell, the reporter then returned to transcription,
reporting the testimony of the rooming house owner (who testified that there
was nothing peculiar about Hillmon's mouth or his lips and that he recognized
the corpse as Hillmon the minute he saw it)." It does not appear that the lady
described in the revelation ever became a witness, although the newspaper's
readers could not have failed to note her uncanny prescience about Hillmon's
villainy.
There then followed synopses of a number of witnesses who said, in more
or less equal number, that Hillmon did or did not have a defective tooth, and
then this:
STARTLING DEVELOPMENTS!
Mrs. Lowell, wife of M.L.Lowell of this city, has a brother who left here on the
5th of last March, for Wichita, and to go from there southwest, and return to
Independence and Humboldt.
She has not heard of him since he went away, although it was customary for
him to write her often. From the description of the dead body brought here she
thinks it is her brother, and as we go to press parties are on the way to the cem-
etery to take up the remains and let her see them."
When word of this report reached Medicine Lodge, the journalists of the Cresset
remarked: "We would kindly suggest to the lady in question, that she search
the Penitentiary, as these silent brothers are more likely to turn up there or on
a cottonwood tree, than in the grave of a respectable citizen."89 But it seems to
have been taken seriously in Lawrence, and represents the first suggestion
found in any account of the case concerning a possible alternate identity for
the deceased man.
As for Mrs. Lowell, apparently she proved a disappointment to the murder
theorists; once the body was dug up again and shown to her she was unable to
recognize it as anyone she knew. The missing brother of Mrs. Lowell was only
the first of many persons mooted as the dead man, just as Frederick Adolph
Walters was only the last. The same article that reported Mrs. Lowell's
anticlimactic discovery informed the reader that "[I]t was reported yesterday
that a young man from Indiana saw the body brought here and recognized it as
that of a friend who left Indiana some time ago, for Wichita, and has not since
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been heard of. Many wild rumors are afloat, but as yet there has been nothing
definite learned concerning him."'" This young man of Indiana, the second
proposed victim of Hillmon and Brown, was never again mentioned. Brown's
departure from Lawrence, however, was the subject of comment.
WHERE IS BROWN?
Brown has not been heard from since he left so mysteriously yesterday morn-
ing, nor is his whereabouts known. It was supposed that he went to Wyandotte
to visit his family, but such was not the case. Brown should not have been
allowed to leave the city until the inquest was closed, especially as such damag-
ing testimony against him had been brought out.
92
The reporting suggests a link between Brown's failure to present himself at
the inquest every day and the implications of the testimony, although to this
point it is difficult to identify anything "damaging" to Brown that has been
adduced. Later testimony at the inquest focused on the question of Brown's
whereabouts, but it revealed nothing sinister: it seemed he had checked out of
the place where he had been staying in Lawrence, saying that he was going
home to his family in Wyandotte, 93 a place less than forty miles away.
The report of the next day's proceedings began with the proposition that
"public opinion is somewhat divided, yet the very general opinion is that the body
is not that of Hillmon," and went on the recount the testimony of a Mrs. McCoy,
who said that she was John Hillmon's sister, and that she had written a letter to
Sallie Hillmon asking for an opportunity to see her brother's body one last time,
but had received no reply. Moreover, she said that her brother was less than five
feet nine inches tall, had a missing tooth, and a scar on his left hand caused by a
firearms accident. When dug up again 94 the corpse was found to have no manual
scars "with the exception of a slight mark on the middle finger." 95
The reporter closed this day's account by noting that "[t]he inquiry 'Where
is Mr. Brown?' has not been answered," and then conveying a hint sure to
keep his readers' suspense level high for the next day's edition:
A small circle of persons interested in the case have been very much agitated all
day, and the appearance of things indicate that there are coming developments
that will astonish a great many persons. Though a Standard reporter got an
inkling of the matter, he was bound over to keep the secret, and nothing can at
362
Wesson - Particular Intentions
present be made known. Suffice it to say there is something now planned to let
a flood of light in upon this dark and fearful mystery.96
Whatever this coming development may have been, it apparently was not
made known to the jury, which rendered its verdict before any other evidence
was taken, finding that the deceased was a person "unknown to the jury" who
came upon his death "in a felonious manner at the hands of one J.H. Brown." '97
The Lawrence Standard was unimpressed with the carping of its rival,
however. Two months after the coroner's verdict, having reviewed all of the
earlier developments for the reader, the paper then related: "It is stated that
Brown sent word from Missouri that he himself did not do the killing as he
claimed in his testimony before the coroner's jury, and that if assured
protection he is ready to turn State's evidence." '98 This brief report presaged
what became the most helpful turn of events of all for the insurance companies
who had insured John Hillmon's life-the defection (albeit temporary)
of Brown from the Hillmon camp to their own. But before returning to
Mr. Brown and his behavior after the verdict of the coroner's jury, we must
consider the "something" alluded to by the Standard's reporter toward the
end of the inquest, the development that promised to "let a flood of light in
upon this dark and fearful mystery."
THE MAN WHO LEFT WICHITA WITH HILLMON
AND BROWN
The day after forecasting this spectacular revelation, the Standard's reporter
made another, possibly related, prediction:
It is probable that before too many days some man will be missing whose
appearance will correspond to that of the dead body. Or, possibly, the man came
from down in the southwest, where men lead a rambling life, and one would not
be missed."
The jury returned its verdict on the Monday after this suggestion was printed,
but public interest in the case did not abate. Two months later the Standard
printed not only a recapitulation and analysis of the case, but an account of
further discoveries made on behalf of the insurance companies by their trusted
agent Major Wiseman, under the headline WHOSE BODY WAS IT?:
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Armed with the photographs of Hillmon, Brown, and the dead man, the
major went to Wichita and found a number of persons who knew Hillmon
and Brown, and who recognized the photograph of the dead man as that of
Frank Nichols, sometimes called "Arkansaw."... At Wichita the Major found
the baggage of Frank Nichols in pawn for $18 board bill... for the past three
years he had lived in the vicinity of Wichita, [where] he boarded at the same
hotel that Hillmon and Brown stopped at, and became quite intimate with
them. He left Wichita on March 2d and went to Oxford, 35 miles south, to col-
lect some money due for work, stating to some of his friends that he intended
to HERD CATTLE FOR HILLMAN AND BROWN' 0 at $20 a month and
found, and asked his friends' advice in regard to this matter. He stated further
that Hillman had plenty of money, having showed him a bank book contain-
ing records of deposits in a bank in Lawrence of some five thousand dollars.
His friends advised him to accept the situation offered, and he told them after-
wards that he had, and before leaving Wichita, promised to write them, but up
to date, they have never received any letter from him ..... Certain things that
transpired after the three men met near Wellington cannot be related here.
Suffice it to say that one of the party left and the other two traveled together.
In a lovely place fourteen miles north of Medicine Lodge, the shooting took
place. The three men, Brown, Hillman, and Nichols were strangers in Bar-
bour county. The spot where the shooting occurred being about one hundred
miles southwest of Wichita.'
The mystery would seem thus to have been solved, except that as the
reader knows, this solution leaves no room for the proposition that the
dead man was the Iowan Frederick Adolph Walters, author of the
McGuffinesque "Dearest Alvina" letter. Nichols was the third, but still
not the last, of the men proposed by advocates of the murder theory as the
victim of Brown and Hillmon. Note, too, the similarity between the claims
made about Nichols and those later made about Walters-that he had
encountered Hillmon and Brown and been promised excellent wages to
travel with them, had communicated these matters to his friends about the
first or second of May, had later accepted Hillmon's offer, then never been
seen or heard from again. Major Wiseman, Colonel Walker, and the insur-
ance companies' other agents were apparently tireless in their efforts to
locate a convincing actor to cast in this role, and the details of their story
were already becoming clear, even though they had not by this time ever
heard of the cigarmaker from Iowa. In the journalist from Lawrence they
had a useful ally.
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THE TWO ACCOUNTS OF MR. BROWN
It was mid-May when the coroner's jury returned its verdict of murder "at the
hands of John Brown." Curiously, there is no mention of Hillmon in this accu-
sation. Brown must have been feeling alarmed, but the coroner's verdict had
no automatic legal consequences and he was not immediately accused,
arrested, or charged.' 2 Instead, he was approached not long afterward by a
lawyer named W.J. Buchan. Buchan had offices at Wyandotte, near the Brown
family home to which John Brown had repaired after testifying in the pro-
ceedings at Lawrence. The lawyer had several conversations with Brown over
the summer, beginning in May, and eventually spoke as well to Brown's
brother. In September, Brown signed a lengthy statement in the presence of
Buchan and a notary public, and in it he repudiated the story he had told about
Hillmon's death and gave quite a different account. The statement averred
that John Hillmon and his wife's cousin Levi Baldwin had entered into a con-
spiracy to commit insurance fraud, Baldwin's part being to pay the premiums
and Hillmon's (and Brown's) being to journey to the southwest with the
object to "find a subject to pass off as the body of John W. Hillmon, for the
purpose of obtaining the insurance money." He said that the first trip the two
had taken, in late December, was hoped to produce a discovery of someone
who had frozen to death and whose corpse could be passed off as Hillmon's,
but when none was found the men went back to Wichita and Hillmon thence
to Lawrence. Hillmon came back to Wichita in early March and on their sec-
ond venture, according to the statement, the two had encountered a stranger
"the first day out of Wichita, about two or two and one half miles from town."
The stranger "said his name was either Berkley or Burgess, or something that
sounded like that," but Brown and Hillmon "always called him Joe." Hillmon
told Brown that Joe "would do for a subject to pass off for him," but Brown
objected that murder was "something that I had never before thought of, and
was beyond my grit entirely." Nevertheless, by the statement's account, Hill-
mon proceeded with his plan, most foresightedly by persuading "Joe" to
allow Hillmon to vaccinate him for smallpox. Hillmon accomplished this
rather remarkable feat by taking the virus from his own arm, which was
according to Brown "quite bad," and using a pocket knife to insert it into the
other man's. Hillmon also persuaded the other man to trade clothing with
him, and measures were taken to avoid any passersby seeing three men, rather
than two, in the wagon: "sometimes one and then the other would be kept out
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of sight." Apparently as a hedge against any impression of implausibility a
reader might form of these events, the statement explains that the stranger was
"a sort of an easy-go-long fellow, not suspicious or very attentive to any-
thing."
The statement then relates that Hillmon shot and killed the stranger at the
Crooked Creek campground, put his own day book in the dead man's coat,"°3
told Brown to ride for assistance, and then vanished north with "Joe's" valise.
Later, back in Lawrence, Brown (according to the statement) had a
conversation with Sallie Hillmon in which she assured him that "she knew
where Hillmon was, and that he was all right."'
10 4
A more useful document than this affidavit, from the insurance companies'
point of view, can scarcely be imagined. It accounts for all the facts then
known, including the inconvenient vaccination scar, discredits not only
Brown's earlier testimony but two of the most important witnesses (Baldwin
and Sallie Hillmon) who identified the corpse as Hillmon, and makes excellent
use of what had before been the most suggestive circumstance in favor of the
company's position: the suspiciously large amount of life insurance carried by
a poor man like Hillmon. 0 1
Sallie Hillmon had not yet filed suit on the policies (although she did by
then have a lawyer). When Buchan confronted her with the Brown affidavit,
in Brown's presence, she turned to Brown and asked him how he could make
such a statement; she also asked Buchan if he thought she did not know her
own husband's body when she saw it. Brown said to her only that he had made
the statement and would stand by it. 106
By the time of the first trial of the Hillmon case in 1882, Brown had returned
to his original account, testifying for Sallie Hillmon and claiming that Buchan
and the insurance companies had pressured him into swearing to the affidavit.
But most readers of the Supreme Court opinion, learning of Brown's
inconstancies, will likely have the same reaction that this writer did on first
reading: Brown was a weasel and a turncoat, but his affidavit was probably
true. For (I reasoned) there could have been many motivations for Brown to
lie when he said he had killed Hillmon accidentally, chiefly an expectation that
he would share in the insurance proceeds when they were paid. But it seemed
unlikely that he had lied in confessing to the plot as he did in the affidavit.
Pressure from the insurance companies seemed inadequate to account for that
narrative or his willingness to give it, as it would have exposed him to
prosecution as an accomplice to murder.
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Maccracken's account does hint at a certain complexity that arises from the
role of Buchan, the lawyer who persuaded Brown to sign the affidavit. He
notes that although the insurance companies always referred to Bu chan as
Brown's "own attorney," he was paid for his labors by the insurance
companies, and that one of the courts involved called his conduct
"unprofessional."'0 7 Maccracken, however, explains Buchan's behavior with
the suggestion that "he seems to have thought of himself as an arbitrator." ' In
this sympathetic characterization Maccracken follows Gleed, whose "Annual
Report" assets that "[t]he transaction, as far as Buchan was concerned,
became an arbitration, with himself as arbitrator."'0 9 Gleed also maintains
(and Maccracken repeats) that Buchan became involved in the matter only
after Brown begged his own father for assistance and the father retained
Buchan to represent his son."' Buchan's actions as described by Maccracken
seemed questionable; nevertheless, as a naive reader I was prepared to accept
the historian's forgiving explanation and ascribe my reaction to a (perhaps
excessively) nuanced sense of the boundaries of acceptable professional
conduct, instilled in me a century later in a far different legal environment.
But further reading led me back to Buchan's behavior, and caused me to
re-examine my tolerant first conclusion.
The day after the affidavit was signed, another document was executed, this
one by an agent of the insurance companies; it "authorized and employed"
Buchan to procure and surrender the policies of insurance on the life of John
Hillmon." ' Buchan himself would testify later that the only pay he received in
the matter came from the insurance companies. He bridled at the suggestion
that there was anything improper about this, saying that he "was in the habit
of taking fees for his work."" 1
2
John Brown testified that Buchan showed up unbidden, not long after the
inquest had concluded, at a farm in Missouri where Brown was working; the
lawyer came back at least twice more, approaching Brown at places where he was
employed and finally at his brother Reuben's house. On the last occasion, at
Reuben's, Buchan brought with him a man named Ward, whom he said was a
deputy sheriff."3 On each occasion Buchan pressed Brown to sign a statement
saying that the dead man was not Hillmon but another; according to later
testimony from Brown, Buchan told Brown he could "make it appear it was a
man who came out from Wichita; the man called himself Joe;... {and} was killed
by Hillmon and me; and was passed off as Hillmon;... he asked me what I was
doing here, and said they are after you." Brown testified that at Reuben's house,
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with the deputy sheriff Ward in tow, Buchan told Brown that "he only asked me
to do something to benefit myself, and end the matter... said there was a warrant
for my arrest, and I must do something soon." Buchan also informed Brown
"that he was employed to protect me; am well acquainted with the insurance men;
they care nothing for you, and want to keep from paying the money... ." *
Reuben, in his testimony at the first trial, seconded his brother's account.
Buchan, he said, had recruited him to go along when the lawyer first went
calling on John, saying that the brothers' father had retained him to look after
John's interests. On that occasion Reuben heard Buchan attempt to persuade
Brown to say that the dead man was not Hillmon, and heard his brother
refuse. He remembered also Buchan coming to his house some time later with
the deputy sheriff, and telling Reuben that his brother was about to be arrested
if he did not cooperate and sign a statement that it was not Hillmon who died
at Crooked Creek, but that all would be well if John were to sign the statement
and then keep out of sight. Reuben explained in his testimony that he had no
money to defend John with, and added that Buchan had offered to pay John
$o 5 for his board (to defray the cost of boarding with Reuben), and in addition
to "see the insurance agents and not have the warrant served." So Reuben
undertook to convince his brother that it would be better for him to do as
Buchan said, in order to avoid further difficulties, and Brown gave in to these
arguments and signed a paper that Buchan had prepared, then swore to it
before a notary." ' The notary testified in the second trial that Buchan told
Brown not to read the prepared document before he signed it."6 The
document's history then became even more bizarre: after it was shown to Mrs.
Hillmon and did not immediately produce the desired effect of prompting her
to make a similar confession, it was torn to pieces and thrust into a stove in
Buchan's office. Brown (backed up by Sallie Hillmon) claimed that it was he
who treated the paper thus;"7 Buchan said he had done it."' In Brown's
account, the reason for this destructive act was an agreement between the two
men that the document was to be used only to be shown to the insurance
companies' men."9 Buchan maintained that the statement was prepared "as a
guarantee that Brown would testify in case suit was brought that the statement
was true,"120 a description that implies the possibility of use in court to
impeach a discrepant statement (and of course that is the very use to which the
affidavit eventually was put). But Buchan's account is not compatible with his
claim that he tore up the statement and thrust it into the stove; on this point
Brown's story is far more credible.
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Whether or not it was not intended for use in a lawsuit, after the stove
incident Brown must have believed that the statement had been destroyed.
Buchan, however, acknowledged that between the time Brown signed it and
the stove incident, he had given a copy of the affidavit to the insurance
companies' attorneys for the purpose of having it copied. 2' (Copies were
made by hand at the time, so the preparation of a copy was not a casual act.)
But he seems even to have anticipated the possibility that a handmade and
unsigned copy might not be admissible to the same extent as an original: later
he rescued the torn statement from the (evidently unlit) stove, and placed the
pieces in an envelope.' Judge Shiras, presiding in the third trial, ruled that the
copy made at Buchan's direction could not be admitted or described, and that
the matters therein could not be proved unless the original, torn, document
were produced.123 Thanks to Buchan's rescue it was produced (apparently
restored or at least pieced back together), and admitted into evidence for the
impeachment of the man he had claimed was his client.'24
Although Buchan denied or contradicted many aspects of the Brown
brothers' testimony, his own account of the course of his representation is
scarcely less damning. He acknowledged that the only pay he received or
expected for his work on the Brown matter came from the insurance
companies."' in addition to preserving Brown's affidavit after it had been
disposed of into a stove, he admitted passing a letter that Brown wrote to
Sallie Hillmon (implying that "John" was still alive) on to the insurance
companies' lawyers rather than posting it.'26 He agreed that on one occasion
when he had learned of John Brown's whereabouts (from Brown's father,
apparently), he took Colonel Walker along when he went to speak with
Brown, even though he believed that Walker had a warrant for his "client's"
arrest. 27 It was undisputed that he prepared a document that, in exchange for
Brown's affidavit, promised immunity from prosecution for both Brown and
Hillmon. 12 But these negotiations were held only between Brown and
representatives of the insurance companies; no public officials signed any of
the documents, nor is there any discernible evidence of their involvement.
Either Buchan arranged for his "client" to confess to a crime in exchange for a
promise that he knew was worthless, or the insurance companies really did
dictate the administration of criminal justice in Kansas, and Buchan knew it
and was willing to participate in the appropriation of the criminal justice
system for their private purposes. Even allowing for the possibility of a less
rigorous set of professional expectations in i88o Kansas than we might
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entertain today, the behavior of the lawyer Buchan cannot be extenuated as the
work of an "arbitrator." If the testimony of the Brown brothers is to be
believed, his perfidy was shocking; but even if his own account is credited, his
persistent persuasions might easily have caused a poor young man to sign a
statement that he knew was not true in exchange for assurances that he would
face no further trouble if he did so.129
If you are not yet persuaded, consider testimony much later by one of the
companies' own faithful agents. The central claim of the affidavit drafted by
Buchan for Brown's signature was that a man who called himself "Joe Berkley"
or "Joe Burgess" camped and traveled briefly with Brown and Hillmon, and was
later killed at Crooked Creek. In this particular the affidavit capitalized on
Brown's earlier testimony at the inquest that a stranger had been their road
companion one leg of the trip (although there Brown said that the stranger had
left them before they struck out for Crooked Creek).'3 ° But testifying at the last
trial, in 1899, Major Wiseman admitted that he had found "Joe Burgess, " the same
one mentioned in Brown's affidavit, quite alive not long after the Lawrence
inquest.' There was a Joe Burgess, but he was not the same man as Frederick
Adolph Walters, and he was not dead. The affidavit was false.
These reflections are important not only to the judgment of history as it
pertains to Mr. Buchan, but also to the credibility of Brown and, ultimately, to the
significance of the two hearsay letters purporting to be from Frederick Adolph
Walters. Without Brown's affidavit, the defendants had little to rest their case on
but claimed variations between Hillmon's and the dead man's bodies, the oddness
of a man like Hillmon having purchased so much life insurance, and the Walters
letters. The letters and the affidavit (despite certain discrepancies between
them)'32 seem to reinforce one another: each tends to quell doubts about the
reliability of the other. But if the Brown affidavit is dismissed as the product of the
interactions of an unscrupulous lawyer, a relentless set of adversaries, and a
frightened and unlettered young man, the Walters evidence justly falls under new
scrutiny, together with the famous decision that legitimized it.
THE LETTERS IN THE TRIALS
There was no evidence produced of the letters at the Lawrence inquest, of
course, because at that time the insurance companies had not yet learned of
Mr. Walters' disappearance or even of his existence. Instead, it will be
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remembered, the defendants proposed various other possible identities for
the corpse: the missing brother of Mrs. M.L. Lowell, the "young man of
Indiana," and (after the proceeding was over, in the newspapers) Frank
Nichols, also known as "Arkansaw." But by the time of the first trial the
insurance companies had settled on Walters as their main candidate; some of
his family members were summoned as witnesses, and some evidence about
the letters was admitted.
Judge Foster, presiding in the first trial, admitted the fiancee Alvina
Kasten's letter, together with the deposition in which she identified it; Kasten
herself did not testify live at this trial (or any of the others)'33 Elizabeth
Rieffenach, Walters' sister, did testify, but she did not mention the letter about
which she later displayed such an astonishing and particular memory; she was
asked only to examine some exhibit (very likely the Alvina Kasten letter) and
affirm that the handwriting on it was her brother's. 34
Judge Foster's summing-up was rather severe about John Brown and his two
conflicting accounts, instructing the jury that unless his affidavit was not
"voluntarily made," then Brown must be either a "conspirator to cheat and
defraud the insurance companies and in furtherance thereof an accessory to
shedding the blood of an innocent man," or "one who sought to rob the woman
whom he had made a widow of her just dues and blacken and traduce the name
of her dead husband and his own friend."'35 The judge kept the jurors in session
overnight on a Saturday, but after seven ballots the jury remained divided seven
to five in favor of Mrs. Hillmon, and a mistrial was declared.",
In the second trial the Kasten deposition was again received in evidence,
together with the letter.'37 The letter to Mrs. Rieffenach was at this trial
mentioned for the first time, but it was not offered as an exhibit because Mrs.
Rieffenach maintained that she could no longer find it. She was permitted to
testify to the letter's contents, and did so in such remarkable detail, as though
quoting verbatim,'38 that most students of the case take away the impression
that this letter was produced; but it was not. Again the jury hung, this time six
to six.' 39
We know the evidence of the letters was important to the second jury
because after their inability to reach a unanimous verdict brought the trial to
an end, an enterprising reporter interviewed some of the jurors; two of them
were willing to disclose what had been the chief points of discussion in the jury
room. One juror (who had voted for the plaintiff) suggested to the reporter
that if Walters had been in Wichita
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he would certainly have been seen and remembered by somebody. He would
have had a boarding house; he became a cigarmaker, he would certainly have
been remembered by someone of that craft. The fact that there was no attempt
to bring anyone forward, who could say they had seen him in Wichita at that
time, caused us to believe THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING CROOKED
about that letter.
40
Concerning Brown's two accounts, this juror said that they "had considerable
influence, although it was hard to tell which of his stories was true," and also
that "it will be hard to make me believe but what Buchan worked him pretty
hard, to get his evidence for the companies. "14I
It appears that if Brown's dueling statements are seen to cancel one another
out, the letters become important to the jury's deliberations. Yet they must have
failed to convince some, possibly because their authenticity was doubted,
especially in the absence of any corroboration of the events recited in the letters.
The Walters letters thus seem to have operated as tiemakers in the first two
Hillmon trials: aware of their contents, the juries divided and could not decide.
Apparently in response to the reported doubts of the interviewed juror, the
defendants called, at the third trial in 1888, several witnesses to testify that they
had seen Walters, or someone who resembled him, in Wichita in early March,
1879.142 And again they offered the Kasten deposition, together with its
attached copy of the letter she said Walters had sent her, as well as portions of
Mrs. Rieffenach's deposition describing her letter.'43 But this new and revived
evidence availed the defendants little because Judge Shiras forbade any
mention of the contents of the letters, reasoning that their assertions
were hearsay (as no doubt they were).' The jury found unanimously
for Mrs. Hillmon.'45 The letters, it seems, had been essential to the insurance
companies' earlier modest success in staving off a loss; without them they
could not prevent a Hillmon victory. Of course it was this outcome that gave
rise to review of the case by the Supreme Court, where the Court remanded
the matter to be tried yet again before a jury fully apprised of the existence and
content of the Walters letters.1
46
The three trials that ensued after the Supreme Court's 1892 decision
produced outcomes that eerily replicated the first three trials': two more hung
juries, followed by a verdict for Mrs. Hillmon destined to be overturned by the
United States Supreme Court when the litigation reached it for the second time.
But the letters, having by then enjoyed the Supreme Court's attention, sustained
a more focused and searching scrutiny in the last three trials than in the first two.
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The fourth trial, which took place in Topeka in 1895, was the longest of
any-almost three months. On this occasion the insurance companies produced
some evidence that no previous jury had heard. Major Wiseman testified for the
first time that when the body was exhumed at Medicine Lodge, Levi Baldwin's
brother Alva exclaimed, "Hell! That ain't Hillmon."'I4 In addition, the
defendants called three citizens of Lawrence who had served as jurors at the
inquest there; they testified, with remarkable unanimity, that during the inquest
Mrs. Hillmon had said that she could not remember or did not know the color of
her husband's hair and eyes, nor his height.'48 As no official transcript was
preserved of these proceedings, Mrs. Hillmon's lawyers were not in position to
impeach this testimony, but this author is: contemporaneous newspaper
accounts report that she described the color of his hair and eyes (eyes dark
brown, hair brown, whiskers lighter than hair) in addition to many other
features of his appearance (dark complexion, sometimes wore chin whiskers and
sometimes only a moustache, hair quite straight and tolerably long, cheek bones
quite prominent at times, depending on his weight).' 4 (It is true that she said she
could not certainly state his height, never having measured him.) Two of these
jurors also testified that Mrs. Hillmon did not appear affected by the grief one
would expect if her husband were dead; one said she was "frivolously good-
natured and jovial."' 50 But the Lawrence Standard's otherwise unsympathetic
chronicler of the inquest had reported, to the contrary, that as Sallie Hillmon
recounted for the inquest the last letter she had received from her husband, she
"appeared considerably affected," and that "her grief, because of his death, has
all the appearance of being genuine and heart-felt." "'
As for the letters, neither Alvina Kasten nor Elizabeth Reiffenach
appeared in person at the fourth trial, but their depositions were admitted.
Another sibling, Miss Fannie Walters, testified at length about her brother's
appearance and his resemblance to photographs of the corpse taken when it
was exhumed at Lawrence, and she did aver that the family had received a
final letter from him postmarked Wichita in early March of 1879, but she did
not testify to its contents.'52 And the brother C.R. Walters, who lived at the
time of Frederick Adolph's disappearance not with the sisters and father in
Ft. Madison, but in Missouri, remembered (as he did in the first trial) a letter
he said he had received during February of 1879, postmarked Wichita. His
memory of this missing letter had grown a bit more particular with time: he
said it related that his brother "had made arrangements to drive cattle for a
man by the name of Hillmon" in Colorado, and wished to postpone plans
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the two brothers had made to meet and go to Leadville for the gold mining
until after his engagement with Hillmon. 53
This brotherly letter (like the one Mrs. Reiffenach claimed) was not
produced, but another one was, by Mrs. Hillmon's lawyers: a letter that
C.R. Walters had written to the sheriff of Leavenworth in 188o, stating that
his brother Frederick Adolph had a gold filling in his teeth.' 4 This letter was
most inconvenient to the defendants, as their proof had been as adamant on
the untouched perfection of the corpse's teeth as on any point in the
litigation. C.R. Walters' firm recollection that it was cattle, not sheep, that
were the subject of Hillmon's intentions as described in the letter was also a
bit of an embarrassment, as the Kasten letter mentioned the woollier species.
The jury in this trial hung eleven to one in favor of Mrs. Hillmon.5 5
The fifth trial followed the fourth by a year; it began and ended in March of
1896. There were the familiar disagreements about resemblances and
disparities between the living Hillmon and the corpse, and evidence of the
contradictory accounts given by John Brown. Once again the epistolary
productions of Mr. Walters, addressed to Kasten, Rieffenach, and C.R.
Walters, became the subject of proof. There was also a rather spectacular
witness who was heard in this trial for the first time, a Patrick Heely of
St. Louis. Mr. Heeley testified that seventeen years earlier, in the winter of
1879, he had known Frederick Adolph Walters in Wichita-for about two
months prior to March ist, he said. Walters worked for him in Wichita, said
Heeley, helping him sell railroad excursion tickets, and the two men had seen
each other at least once a day. On about March ist he said he saw Walters with
another man whom Walters introduced as John Hillmon; on a later occasion,
he saw Walters alone and Walters said he was going with Hillmon to start a
cattle ranch.'56 This testimony in retrospect seems dubious. Heeley was quite
certain that his acquaintance with, and employment of, Walters had lasted for
at least the two months prior to March ist, and that he had seen him at least
once every day in Wichita during that time; at the sixth trial, however,
Elizabeth Rieffenach produced a letter postmarked February 9, 1879 at
Emporia (about eighty wintry miles from Wichita) in which her brother
writes that he is staying in that city and has not had much employment
recently."7 But this letter was not known to the jurors of the fifth trial. They
also hung, a majority of the jurors apparently in favor of the defendants.'58
The sixth trial began in a manner that resembled the others, but offered several
significant new revelations. For the first time, Elizabeth Rieffenach produced a
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cache of letters that she said had been written home by her brother during the year
between his departure from Ft. Madison and the missing Wichita letter.'59 Their
purpose was to show that he often signed his letters "FA Walter" (not Walters, the
family name); by then Mrs. Hillmon's lawyers had noticed and pointed out that the
Kasten letter was signed in this fashion.'60 It was also claimed to be obvious that the
handwriting on these letters matched that of the "Dearest Alvina" letter, a
proposition that Mrs. Hillmon's lawyers did not dispute. 6' But this collection is
interesting for another reason as well: although the missives suggest that Walters
visited Council Bluffs, Kansas City, Warrensburg, Paola, Aladdin, Lawrence, and
Emporia, Kansas, as well as Holden, Missouri, during this year, 6' there is no
evidence in them that Walters ever stayed or worked in Fort Scott, Wellington, or
Arkansas City-the places that the "Joe" of John Brown's affidavit said he had
been working. The tendency of this evidence to disprove that "Joe Burgess" and
Frederick Adolph Walters were the same man was reinforced when Major
Wiseman confessed that he had found Joe Burgess--the same Joe "of whom there
was some talk of [his] having been the body which was shipped back for that of
Hillmon"-alive more than twenty years before.'63
There was a surprise rebuttal witness for the plaintiff, a man named
Simmons--his testimony is discussed below. But before that, about midway
through the trial, a controversy arose about whether it could continue,
occasioned by an attempt to corrupt one of the jurors. One of the jurors
communicated to Judge Hook that he had been approached with a
"communication... which he interpreted as preliminary to an offer to bribe."
The juror had rejected this overture outright, and Judge Hook seemed content to
proceed with the trial, but defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, and
for dismissal of the jurors, insisting that in light of the respective financial
positions of the parties, "it would make an impression upon the jury that if anyone
had done that, it was the defendants in this case, because the defendants have the
money."' ' The judge declined to interrupt the trial. The jurors deliberated for
less than a day before returning a unanimous verdict for Mrs. Hillmon.'65
THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE MCGUFFIN
There is more than enough reason to doubt the authenticity of the famous
Walters letters, indeed to doubt whether the Rieffenach letter ever existed at all.
Apparently at least some of the jurors thought so as well: the companies never
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managed to persuade a unanimous jury of their case, although it would seem
that any juror who credited the authenticity and truth of the letters would be
nearly compelled to conclude that the dead man was not Hillmon but Walters.
Curiously, Mrs. Hillmon's lawyers do not seem to have pursued the possibility
that the letters were fakes; there is no doubt of their zealous advocacy but this
particular point is not one that appears to have occurred to them. Nevertheless,
reasons for doubting the letters' genuineness are numerous.
There are significant incompatibilities between the account in John
Brown's affidavit, which was the defendants' most important evidence, and
the Kasten letter. In the letter, which was postmarked Wichita on March 2nd,
1879, and begins with the inscription "Wichita, Kansas, Mar ist 79" the writer
states "I will stay here until the fore part of next week & then will leave here to
see part of the Country that I never expected to see when I left home as I
am going with a man by the name of Hillmon who intends to start a sheep
range ... "66 In the affidavit prepared and urged on him by Buchan, John
Brown swore that he and Hillmon "overtook a stranger on this trip the first
day out from Wichita, about two and one-half miles from town. Who Hillmon
invited to get in and ride." According to the affidavit, the stranger said he was
named "Berkley, Burgis, or something sounding like that, we always called
him Joe," and claimed that he "had been around Fort Scott awhile, and had
worked about Wellington and Arkansas City." 67 This portion of the affidavit
is perfectly consistent with the testimony Brown gave at the inquest saying
that he and Hillmon had been joined by a stranger during some of their travels.
But in the affidavit "Joe" has become the man who, according to the
remainder of the affidavit and the companies' claims, was killed at Crooked
Creek and left behind to masquerade as Hillmon's cadaver. If there were such
a man, however, it would not have been the man who wrote the "Dearest
Alvina" letter. If Frederick Adolph Walters were the "stranger" referred to in
Brown's affidavit, perhaps he might have employed an alias., and possibly he
might even have claimed to have worked in places that he had not. But another
discrepancy cannot be explained away: if the letter writer were Walters, how
could he have met up with Hillmon in Wichita, and posted a letter from
Wichita thereafter describing this encounter? According to Brown's affidavit,
he and Hillmon encountered the stranger two or two and half miles outside of
Wichita. If Walters met Hillmon in Wichita, then he was not the man Brown
describes in his affidavit, and thus not the man who, according to the affidavit,
was murdered at Crooked Creek. 168
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The insurance companies did not know of Walters' existence or
disappearance at the time the attorney Buchan persuaded Brown to sign the
affidavit. Eventually the insurance companies' men, who were alert to any news
of missing young men, learned that the family of Frederick Adolph Walters was
looking for their vanished relative. By then it was too late to go back and change
the name-Joe Berkley or Burgess-that Buchan had written into the affidavit.
But Walters' disappearance was too suggestive for the defendants not to make
use of it, especially after their earlier candidates for the identity of the corpse
proved so disappointing. All that was needed to transform it into strong proof that
Hillmon had not died at Crooked Creek was a document to tie the vanished man to
the Crooked Creek corpse, and a witness to authenticate it. The Kasten letter and
Miss Alvina Kasten satisfied this need almost perfectly. If Walters really had met
John Hillmon, he would not have been mistaken about when and where. But if a
member of the insurance companies' team composed the Kasten letter for the
purpose of deceiving a jury, the composer might have overlooked the discrepancy
between its contents and the Brown affidavit.
Still, the mind resists this last possibility, because it requires us to conclude
that Alvina Kasten lied when she testified, in her deposition, that she had
received the letter on March 3, 1879. We must also conclude that Elizabeth
Rieffenach never received the lost letter that she testified contained nearly the
same information (as did her brother C.R. Walters), and must credit the
insurance companies' agents and lawyers with sufficient dishonesty to create a
brazenly inauthentic document and suborn the perjury of these witnesses.
Can this rather extravagant hypothesis be supported? I believe that it is not
only supportable but nearly irresistible, and that a narrative that accounts for
all of the known facts must lead us to the conclusion that the Kasten letter was
a fake (and that the Rieffenach letter never existed).
We know that the lawyer Buchan, an attorney who conceded that he worked
for and was paid by the insurance companies, employed shocking coercion to
persuade John Brown to sign the affidavit, a document shown to be false by the
later testimony of Major Wiseman. 69 We also know that not long before Alvina
Kasten gave her deposition (the only occasion when she ever swore to her
receipt of the letter) Buchan dictated to Brown the language of a letter
addressed to Sallie Hillmon, suggesting that the writer and the addressee were
conspirators in a plot and that John Hillmon was still alive. The circumstance
that there was never even any pretense of actually mailing the letter to Mrs.
Hillmon-that Buchan sent it directly to the insurance company lawyersI" -
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suggests both the nakedness of Buchan's motive for having Brown write it, and
the clumsiness of his methods. Mr. Buchan was no stranger to the fabrication of
evidence-epistolary evidence-nor was he too scrupulous to pressure an
individual into swearing to propositions that were not true.
Neither was Buchan the only attorney in the employ of the companies
who participated on the presentation of false evidence. At least three
witnesses who testified at the fourth trial-the three jurors from the
Lawrence inquest-testified falsely about what Mrs. Hillmon had said at
that proceeding.' 7 The witnesses were examined in these trials by attorneys
Green and Barker, both of whom were present at the inquest-indeed
conducted it-and surely knew that these witnesses' testimony was untrue.
Other testimony presented by the defendants-such as that of the doctor
who said that John Hillmon reported his height to be 5' ii" (the length of the
dead body) when examined for his insurance policy, but came back
unbidden a few days later to say he was in fact only 5'9"--is far enough
beyond implausible to arouse a serious suspicion of subornation.'72 And it
surely reflects on the ethics of the companies' lawyers that they continued to
maintain for years after their agent had located "Joe Burgess" alive that he
and Frederick Adolph Walters were the same (dead) man.'73
But if the defendants' lawyers were capable of such chicanery as document
fakery and subornation, what would have induced such respectable women as
Alvina Kasten and Elizabeth Reiffenach to perjure themselves? Of Kasten
more later, but as to Reiffenach, a possible explanation appears in a newspaper
account of the second trial. The reporter concludes an account of the day's
testimony with the following:
It is not generally known that there was an insurance on the life of young
Walters, who is said to have been the dead body taken to Lawrence and passed
for the body of Hillman. A reporter for THE TIMES was informed yesterday
afternoon that Walters' life was insured and that the insurance money was paid,
on the evidence elicited in the Hillman trial, of his death.
74
The Leavenworth Times was not sympathetic towards Sallie Hillmon' 75 Probably
the report of insurance on Walters' life found its way into print as a way of sug-
gesting that some insurance agent was so convinced that the dead man was
Walters that he paid out his company's money on the strength of this conviction.
But to this writer the reported circumstance suggests another possibility
altogether. The defendants repeatedly argued the unlikelihood that such a man as
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John Hillmon would purchase insurance on his worthless life; could Frederick
Adolph Walters, an unmarried man and a cigarmaker by trade, have been any
likelier to invest in such a cause? Hillmon had a wife to provide for, but Walters
had no dependents. But if the defendants wished to induce his sister and other
members of the Walters family to testify (as they did) about correspondence from
Frederick Adolph that mentioned the name Hillmon, what better method of com-
pensating them for their trouble than retrospectively issuing a policy of insurance
on his life, then paying the proceeds to his bereaved family-a gesture splendidly
synchronous with their insistence that he had died at Crooked Creek?
Beyond pecuniary motives, however, I believe that the Walters family, or
some of its members, did truly come to believe that the photographs of the
dead man were those of their lost son and brother Frederick Adolph. A little
suggestion and an adroit presentation of the photos would go a long way
toward persuading a baffled and worried family whose loved one had
suddenly ceased writing that his death by murder was the explanation. 76
Their evident belief that Frederick Adolph had died at Crooked Creek may
have pressed the family toward participation in perjury, if they thought it
would produce justice for their missing member. C.R.Walters even
admitted to this motivation on cross-examination during the last trial, while
trying to explain a piece of inconvenient evidence. He had written to the
Sheriff Clarke of Douglas County about his missing brother, and mentioned
that he thought his brother had fillings in his teeth. 77 This evidence was of
course at odds with the insurance companies' persistent claim that the
corpse had had perfect, unblemished, unaltered teeth. C.R.'s explanation,
elicited on redirect by J.W. Green, was revealing. He said he had been told
that Clarke was working for the Hillmon side, and that:
... I had a feeling of vengeance in the matter and was naturally suspicious on all
sides, and while I had no sympathy for the insurance companies.., still I had the
fear that the murderer would not be brought to terms unless he was brought
there by the insurance companies, and that prompted me to make some state-
ments to Mr. Clarke that may not be altogether true.
78
It is obscure why his belief that Clarke was working for Sallie Hillmon would
prompt C.R. Walters to misrepresent the perfection of his brother's teeth. But his
confession of his desire to see the "murderers" brought to justice, and his belief
that it was only the insurance companies that could accomplish this goal, is telling.
If he harbored this belief, other members of his family may have done so as well.
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Sallie Hillmon's lawyers must have compared the Kasten letter to
others, and been convinced that the handwriting was the same. Kasten's
deposition was taken in June of 188i, a year before the first trial, in her
home town of Ft. Madison, Iowa, and it is this deposition that served
thereafter as the defendant's evidence concerning the famous letter. In
this deposition she identifies an exhibit (Exhibit "C") as a letter beginning
"Dearest Alvina" received by her on the 3 rd of March, 1879; she says she
recognizes the handwriting as that of her fiance' 9 F.A. Walters, from
whom she testified she had received a letter every two weeks, or week and
a half, since his departure from Ft. Madison nearly a year earlier. The
letter contains the familiar description of his encounter with "a man by the
name of Hillmon who intends to start a sheep range" and his intention to
accept the man's offer of employment at "more wages than I could make
at anything else."
Kasten testified that she had given this letter to Mr. Tillinghast,
representing the New York Life Insurance Company, in January of i88o.
She said that Tillinghast had come to see her, on the occasion when she gave
him the letter, with Daniel Walter, one of Frederick Adolph's brothers. The
Walters brother had been there earlier in the month, she said, to show her
some pictures of the dead man. She identified only one of them, the side
view, as her sweetheart; about the other she said she could not tell. 8
What might have been Miss Alvina Kasten's motives for lying under
oath? Perhaps it would have been hard for her to acknowledge that her
fianc6 had simply chosen not to come home to her, and to stop writing; his
death at the hands of Hillmon may have been a less painful explanation for
his disappearance. And once recruited to this explanation, perhaps she (like
C.R. Walters) was not difficult to enlist in the enterprise of denying the
wicked Hillmons the proceeds of their crime, by agreeing that a letter she
was shown had actually been received by her shortly after it was dated. She
may have been persuaded that the letter was intended for her and had
somehow gone astray, but that it would benefit the Hillmons were she
truthfully to acknowledge that she had not received it by post. She may also
have been promised that she needed only to testify at a deposition and would
never have to appear before a judge, for as a resident of Iowa she was not
susceptible to the subpoena of a Kansas federal court.
We know Alvina Kasten never did appear in court, which prompts the
question, why not? Would it not have behooved the defendants (who
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brought in many wimesses from much farther away than Iowa) to persuade
the bereaved fianc&e to travel to the trial? Yet they did not do so.'1 ' The
suggestion that wounded romantic pride might account for a respectable
young woman's small bout of perjury may seem fanciful, but consider her
testimony that she destroyed all of her correspondence from Adolph-
except of course for the letter she had turned over to the insurance
companies in 188 1.' Why? She "was sick at the time and did not expect to
get over my sickness and destroyed all my letters." in Apparently she did not
want her letters read in case she died, but this modesty does not comport
with her earlier eagerness to surrender the "Dearest Alvina" letter for use in
litigation. The destruction of the letters is, however, compatible with some
belated doubts about the martyrdom of her swain, although hard evidence
of his perfidy would not appear for many years after the young lady gave her
deposition.
THE MAN WHO OWNED A CIGAR FACTORY
Consider testimony from the sixth and last trial, in 1899 , by one Arthur Sim-
mons. It appears that the defendants may actually have located Mr. Simmons
originall. for a pro-defendant newspaper's coverage of the last trial mentions
toward the end of the plaintiffIs case that it expects testimony from the defen-
dants that "Walters was in Leavenworth in the year 18-8 and that while here
worked for the tobacco house of Staiger & Simmons." But when given, the
testimony of Simmons differed from this prediction by a highly significant year,
and he was in the end called by the plaintiff as a rebuttal witiess. He testified that
for three weeks in May of i 8-c--that is, two months afer the death at Crooked
Creek-he employed Frederick Adolph Walters in his factory as a cigarmaker.
Nor was his testimony the only proof of these events; Simmons produced
records of employment corroborating this claim. He knew the young man as F.
Walters, and he identified a photograph of the young Frederick Adolph as one of
the man who had made cigars for him. He testified that even after the interven-
ing years he had a good recollection of the young cigarmaker because
[hie was a man who was all the time talking to the men about him and telling of
his many travels. He had been in a large number of towns in different places and
he also talked a great deal of his love scrapes and how he had gotten out of
them 85
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Now perhaps this Arthur Simmons was lying through his teeth and had coun-
terfeited the employment records bearing Walters' name,"86 but short of out-
right bribery there is no apparent reason why he should have done these
things for Mrs. Hillmon or her attorneys."7 And if Simmons was truthful, his
testimony not only directly disproves the insurance companies' claims about
the corpse, but also suggests something of Alvina Kasten's place in Mr.
Walters' life. It may cast some light on her coyness about whether they were
engaged, point to the reasons why he may have left his home and family in
Iowa for a more uncertain but freer life, make some sense of her decision to
destroy his correspondence, and explain why Walters did not make himself
known when the publicity about the Hillmon case reached him.
The Leavenworth Times was scornful of the Simmons evidence when it was
first presented. The newspaper's trial reporter argued that it would have been
impossible, so soon after the notorious death at Crooked Creek, for Walters or
his employer Simmons to have been unaware that information about a young
man named Walters was being sought in nearby Lawrence in connection with
an inquest and the possibility that he might have been a victim of
homicide.'88 But this argument represents pure revisionism, because in May
of 1879 the name of Walters had not been publicly associated with speculation
about the identity of the corpse in the Hillmon case. Indeed, in June of 1879
the Lawrence papers were still speculating that the dead man was Frank
Nichols, also known as "Arkansaw." By that time F. Walters had left the
employ of Mr. Simmons and moved on. (Simmons said that he employed
about twenty-five men at a time and that they "changed often.") 8' Certainly
the name of Walters came up at the first trial, in 1882, but Simmons testified
that although he remembered the trial he did not attend it." 0
But would not the news that he was thought to be dead have reached
Walters himself at some point, especially if he remained nearby? And would
not Walters then have made himself known, and by this act relieved the
sorrow of those who loved him and mourned his supposed demise? If he was
the young man described by Arthur Simmons, an adventurer and traveler and
a bit of a rake, maybe not. Perhaps he would have preferred to remain lost,
especially if the insurance companies that had placed so much stock in his
death were eager to subsidize his adventures away from home. And if this deal
were struck, what would have been more sensible than for one of the
companies' agents (my money would be on Mr. Buchan) to require Walters
for his part to pen a letter, its contents partly dictated, to someone back home?
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The letter could then serve as evidence for the companies' propositions about
the corpse at Crooked Creek. (The dictation technique was precisely the
method employed by Buchan to obtain a letter containing conspiratorial
language handwritten by John Brown and addressed to Sallie Hillmon, a
document never intended to be mailed but designed to suggest the existence of
a plot between the two). 9' In such a case, the handwriting similarity between
the "Dearest Alvina" letter and the letters later produced by Elizabeth
Rieffenach would be no coincidence or forgery; they would indeed have been
written by the same hand.
Of course, the letter to Alvina Kasten, having been created some time after
the inquest, would have to be supplied with a Wichita postmark of a much
earlier date. Although the original cannot be examined, the handwritten copy
that remains available for inspection represents that the original was
postmarked "Wichita-Mar 2, 1879." (The original envelope, containing the
mark, is not in the archive, and apparently spent the years between Alvina
Kasten's 188i deposition and the later trials in the safekeeping of Mr. J.W.
G reen.)' 92 But nineteenth century American postmarks, or cancellations, were
neither distinctive nor uniform. 93 Forging one would not have been much of
a challenge, and there is no suggestion that any of Mrs. Hillmon's lawyers
scrutinized the cancellation or the letter with any suspicion.
REMAINING MYSTERIES
But even if the matter of the postal cancellation does not pose much difficulty
for us, two questions remain to trouble the convictions of those who would
believe that John Hillmon died at Crooked Creek. Why would a ranch hand
purchase such an extraordinary amount of life insurance (the premiums, it was
claimed, were more than his yearly income)?'94 And why did the insurance
companies fight this case so bitterly, at such great length and expense, if not
because of a principled refusal to capitulate to fraud? The answers cannot be
known, but here are some that I think not unlikely.
The Brown affidavit, which was written by Buchan, says that Levi
Baldwin's part in the conspiracy was to supply the money for the premiums, 9'
and the companies always insisted that Baldwin had invested money in the
criminal scheme. Indeed part of their case consisted of the testimony of one of
Baldwin's creditors, who claimed that Baldwin had attempted to put off a
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payment of a debt by saying that he would soon have $io,ooo from the
Hillmon insurance proceeds.' Sallie Hillmon never contradicted the claim
that Baldwin had supplied some of the premium money. But these
circumstances need not suggest that Baldwin and Hillmon had conspired to
defraud the companies; it might instead mean that Baldwin, a venturesome
fellow by all accounts, thought that a bet against his friend Hillmon's return
from a winter sojourn into wild territory, where blinding blizzards or Indian
attacks could strike at any time, was a sensible investment. Very possibly Levi
Baldwin and John Hillmon had an unwritten side agreement about the
disposition of the proceeds in the event John met with a fatal misfortune
during his travels: Baldwin would recover a generous return on his
investment, but make sure that Sallie was taken care of. Sallie may even have
been aware of the agreement. If so, it's not surprising that Baldwin and Sallie
Hillmon would not have wanted to acknowledge the side agreement once the
matter was in litigation, 9 ' as it would have been portrayed as (and perhaps
was) a devious and ghoulish scheme, and might have given rise to an attempt
by the companies to evade payment on the ground that the real party in
interest, Baldwin, had no insurable interest in Hillmon's life. But such an
agreement would not suggest that John Hillmon intended to commit murder
or insurance fraud.
The motivations of the defendants are more difficult to explain-indeed it
would be hard to rationalize them no matter who died at Crooked Creek,
because the insurance companies must have spent more defending the
Hillmon case than they would have had to pay out had they honored Mrs.
Hillmon's claim. They eventually settled her claims for nearly forty thousand
dollars, all of their investigative and legal expenses constituting losses beyond
this amount. Suspicion of fraud very likely did, however, account for the
companies' initial refusal to pay the claim.
Fraud was understood by all insurance company executives to be a serious
problem for their industry in the second half of the nineteenth century, and
many notorious swindles were reportedly accomplished by means that bore a
certain resemblance to aspects of the Hillmon affair. The underworld of life
insurance fraud had become so colorful and so worrying by the 187os that it
merited extended treatment in a book called Remarkable Stratagems and
Conspiracies: An Authentic Record of Surprising Attempts to Defraud Life
Insurance Companies, by J.B. Lewis and C.C. Bombaugh."8 Among the cases
there recounted is one that arose in Wichita, Kansas, where in 1873 a house
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contractor named A.N. Winner is said to have schemed to insure a friend of
his named McNutt for Sooo, and then collect the proceeds after faking
McNutt's death by fire. But a body was needed for the scheme to succeed, and
McNutt apparently confessed to luring a victim from Kansas City to Wichita
by promising him a job, and then murdering him in gruesome fashion.'"
One of the decade's most notorious attempts at life insurance fraud was
undertaken in Baltimore in i8-2 by two confederates, William Udderzook and
Wmfield Scott Goss. -After insuring Goss's life for S25,ooo altogether, through
three different companies. the men obtained a corpse from a medical supplier
and staged a kerosene lamp explosion after placing the cadaver in Goss's
rented house. The burned corpse was claimed to be Goss but the insurance
companies refused to pay. One of their main points of suspicion was a claimed
disparity between the teeth of the corpse and those of the living Goss. In a
reversal of the later dental dispute in Hilmon, the insurers claimed that Goss
had strikingly good teeth but that the corpse (whom they arranged to be
exhumed a year after burial) had a severely decayed set. Udderzook
apparently became alarmed by the Nigor of the companies' investigations,
which included the widespread circulation of photographs of Goss inquiring
whether anyone had seen the living man. He decided that Goss, who was in
hiding in New Jersey and had a weakness for liquor, could not be trusted to
remain out of sight; so he lured him to some nearby woods and murdered him.
Udderzook was hanged for the murder of Goss in i874 .: O
One thus can scarcely blame insurance company executives for their suspicions,
once the Hillmon death was reported to them. The similarities between its features
and certain details of spectacular frauds in their -en recent memories were
striking: the three insurance policies totaling S2j,ooo in Goss-Udderzook, and the
Wichita connection and the recent marriage of the alleged deceased and the pohL-
beneficiary in -inner-McNurt.Y One of the Hillmon defendants, the Mutual Life
Insurance Company of New York. had even been a party to the Goss-
Undderzook litigation, which had resulted in a xerdict for the purported widow of
Goss that was onlv overturned after Udderzook's murder of Goss led to his
conviction.' - Neither is it surprising that the companies' agents used the
techniques of demanding exhumation, comparing teeth, and blanketing the
countryside with photographic flyers in the Hillmon investigation, as those
measures had worked well in earlier, successful fraud investigations.as
But although these environmental circumstances might explain the
companies' initial suspicions. they cannot account for their adamantine
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resistance to settling Mrs. Hillmon's claim over the course of nearly a quarter
century of expensive litigation. For these reasons, I believe we must look to
the professional lives of the local lawyers who represented them, whose advice
must surely have guided their clients' decisions.
These lawyers were prominent leaders of the Kansas legal and business
community. There was of course James W. Green, the county attorney who
became the first Dean of the state's law school, whose interests required the
cultivation of the business community. And there was Charles Gleed,
author of the report on the case that Wigmore made famous. Gleed was
called to the Bar in 1884; the second Hillmon trial was his first important
legal engagement." 4 The reputation he earned by assisting in this litigation
led to his retention by the State of Kansas, in 1885, to represent it in litigation
before the United States Supreme Court concerning the constitutionality of
state law prohibiting alcoholic beverage production, a remarkable
assignment for a young man barely admitted to the practice of law. 205 A year
later he and his firm (which included his brother) acquired two railroads as
clients; later in the decade they represented the telephone company as well
as land mortgage companies and eastern interests who invested in western
real estate mortgages. During this time many Kansas farmers lost their
farms because of crop losses, disastrous weather, and low farm product
prices; the law firm prospered by prosecuting foreclosure suits, and
advertised itself widely in the eastern states as the best firm to protect
eastern investors in Kansas farm property."6 Gleed's biographer observes
that "lawyers like the Gleeds were the most fortunate of all the parties who
participated in the land mortgage business in Kansas during the i88os and
i89os. They were able to collect their legal fees in spite of the financial losses
being experienced by others.""2 7 The Gleed brothers often opposed actions
under consideration by the Kansas Legislature that would have protected
farmers against foreclosure, arguing that such legislation would alarm and
drive away eastern investors.
2 8
Gleed also served as a Regent of the University of Kansas and several times
he toyed with the idea of running for political office. The uniting theme of all of
his business and political activity was his conviction that "[m]any of the
business enterprises with which he was connected and the prosperity of the
state as a whole were dependent upon a continued flow of eastern and
European capital unto the West."2"9 In one of his many public speaking
engagements, he sought to alert his fellow citizens to the danger that powerful
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eastern interests would withdraw their participation in the state's economy if
Kansas could not overcome its reputation as an unsafe and uncivilized outpost.
We are compared to the people of Mexico, and the suggestion is freely offered
that we be annexed to that turbulent republic. We are done up in satire, stung all
over with barbed wit, and blistered with abuse. We are described as cranks, fad
chasers, and political unaccountables generally.
Ours is called the home of the hobby and the land of the ism. It is wondered
if we are never to quit "bleeding"-and if our hemorrhage is uncurable. It is
remembered against us that every social or political opinion ever known since
Kansas has been a state has been noisily played with by its disciples, whether few
or many. It is flung at us that we have always been puritanical in our opinions,
intemperate in our enthusiasms, and violent in our methods."0
Gleed eventually became the owner of the Kansas City Journal, but his
journalistic ethics were assailed over the years by the accusation that he used
the newspaper's editorial policy to promote the interests of the Santa Fe
Railroad, his client; it was a business whose fortunes he saw as central to the
aspirations of Kansas. 1 ' Gleed was unrepentant about his journalistic biases;
his biographer attributes to him the sentiment that "[t]he economic well-
being of the nation depended on the ability of capitalists to receive an
adequate return on their investments, and it seemed necessary for business
leaders to seek to influence public opinion in an era when their interests
were being threatened..." 2"2 Nearly all of Gleed's business ventures failed,
and he died without leaving much of an estate, "an ambitious man who was
disappointed by his failure to become a member of the nation's business
elite."213
Other lawyers came and went for the Hillmon defendants. In the last two
trials Green, Barker, and Eugene Ware, a younger member of the Gleed firm,
were joined by Edward Isham of the Chicago law firm Isham, Lincoln, and
Beale. Isham, one of whose partners was the son of Abraham Lincoln, was
held in such apparent awe that the newspapers referred to him as "Judge"
Isham214 and reported that he enjoyed "the distinction of having argued more
cases in the United States Supreme court than any other attorney in
America. ' 215 But it is Green and Gleed whose fingerprints are on decisions
both tactical and strategic for the defendants. The Hillmon case was, for each
of them, the beginning of a career in law and public affairs marked by a
commitment to making Kansas safe for industrial and mercantile interests.
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In Gleed's case, his enthusiasm for debunking Sallie Hillmon's claim
was of a piece with his expressed concern that the eccentricities and antics
of his fellow citizens would alienate the powerful interests on whose
investments the state's economic growth must depend. Gleed would have
fought with every resource he could command to stem any belief in the
community of eastern businessmen that their investments in Kansas
would be susceptible to loss by fraud. And his defiant stance toward Sallie
Hillmon's claim would also have found reinforcement in the culture of
railroad accident litigation in the late nineteenth century, to which he
would have been introduced as a young man in the law department of the
Santa Fe Railroad and throughout the 88os, while his law firm
represented the railroad. One writer described this culture in 1870 as
follows:
The policy of railroad companies is generally to discourage... suits and make
them as expensive and unproductive as possible, in order that other people, in a
similar condition, may be deterred from prosecuting them ....
I think it fair to suggest that the Hillmon case occupied a place of
symbolic and emotional significance, and professional pride, for some of the
defense lawyers that may have disabled them from giving dispassionate
advice to their clients.
As for Sallie Hillmon, by the time the case was over she retained none
of the settlement proceeds; before the last trial she had assigned her
interest in them to other parties.216 Perhaps the decision whether to
continue her exhausting quest for affirmation that her husband was no
murderer was by then not hers at all.2"7 But of her we do know this one
thing: years earlier, before the time when the Supreme Court first heard
the Hillmon case and while there was still some prospect that she would
collect the judgment she had won, Sallie Hillmon had remarried.218 It is
possible that an unschooled waitress in her twenties2"9 pulled off a
devastating double-cross of her first husband, knowing that he would be
compelled to remain hidden while she and her second husband enjoyed
their bigamy and his life insurance proceeds. But isn't it far more likely
that she always knew the truth of what she had claimed from the first
moment she viewed the body that had been brought to Lawrence from
Crooked Creek-that John Hillmon was dead?
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THE HILLMON CASE ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN
YEARS AFTER
220
I have suggested that the legal rule propounded by the Court in the Hillmon
case was created because the only story the Court could bring itself to endorse
demanded it. And I have undertaken to persuade my readers that this story
was untrue. Only the reader knows whether she has been persuaded.
But suppose I have succeeded; what if I am right? What if the letter from
Frederick Adolph Walters to Alvina Kasten was written not when it was dated
and postmarked but later, and not because the writer really wished to inform
Miss Kasten of his whereabouts and plans, but because some agent of the three
insurance companies manufactured this evidence with the assistance of Mr.
Walters, who was paid for his contribution? At the very least, if we are
persuaded of these propositions, we might be able to look at the exception to
the hearsay rule for statements of intention with an eye less deceived by the
McGuffin that has always bound this fragment of legal doctrine to a charming
but mendacious story. Others have debated the pros and cons of the rule and
its variations, but no participant in the debate has questioned the narrative
premise that prompted the Court's invention. Surely the discussion would be
served by this clearer vision of the origins of and necessity for a hearsay
exception admitting statements of the declarant's intentions.
Recent Supreme Court consideration of other hearsay exceptions has cast a
severely critical eye on proponents' easy claims about the inherent credibility
of certain categories of extrajudicial statement.22' If the justification for the
Hillmon hearsay exception is the inherent reliability of statements describing
the declarant's intentions, those I have persuaded about the Walters letter
must look soberly at the statements of Frederick Adolph Walters in the letter
to his dearest Alvina, for if I am correct it is full of falsehoods from the implicit
assertion contained in the date at the top ("Today is March i, 1879"), to its
assurance to Miss Kasten that "I am about as Anxious to see you as you are to
see me," to its recitation of the writer's intentions to look for a place to start a
sheep ranch with John Hillmon., who had promised him "more wages than I
could make at anything else." One might respond that a single
counterexample does not unmake the wisdom of a general rule, but at least the
wisdom of the rule must be defended without reference to that particular
example. This enterprise is one that the law of evidence, in the one hundred
twelve years post-Hillmon, has not seriously undertaken.
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But even if they do not prompt revision of the law of evidence, these
investigations may serve to illustrate the powerful and often unacknowledged
contribution of the narrative imperative-the need to construct an acceptable
story-to the creation of decisional law. Judges may not think of themselves
as storytellers, but this role is not easily abandoned even when disclaimed.
Perhaps the maxim da mihi facta, aho tibi ius undervalues the other
determinants of common-law decisionmaking, but it is a rare narrator who is
willing to throw the McGuffin overboard.
Of course, I cannot claim to be immune myself from the seductions of
narrative. I have here only told another story, albeit one that I believe to be
better justified by the evidence than the understood version. (And of course,
my story has the same McGuffin as the Court's-the Dearest Alvina
letter-although it plays a different role in the two narratives.) I have tried
in telling my version to lash myself to the mast of truth, but I confess I've
enjoyed telling what I believe to be an excellent story, and possibly its siren
call has deceived me as well. Other investigators may prove me wrong; my
sources are available to all.
POSTSCRIPT
It is possible that twenty-first century scientific techniques will make possi-
ble a confident identification of the remains buried in the Oak Hill cemetery
as Hillmon's or Walters'. On March 31, 2006, I was granted permission by
the District Court of Douglas County, Kansas to disinter the corpse from
the grave marked "John Wesley Hillman" in the Oak Hill Cemetery in
Lawrence. On May 19, 2006, a forensic team headed by my colleague
Professor Dennis Van Gerven accomplished the exhumation. The remains
were very deteriorated, but we hope that our further investigations of them
will result in a definitive identification. In that event we will of course report
our findings.
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ular use to describe various insurance frauds. Investigators of the time employed the term to charac-
terize a common scheme in which an individual or syndicate purchased insurance on the life of an ill
or doddering soul, then encouraged the insured to indulge his unhealthy habits or take risks with his
life; sometimes the scheme went so far as to encompass murder. See J.B. Lewis and C.C. Bombaugh,
Stratagems and Conspiracies to Defraud Life Insurance Companies: An Authentic Record of Remarkable
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Cases 53 (New York, G.W. Carleton, 1896) (describing the practice as a "graveyard epidemic")
[hereinafter Remarkable Stratagems]. For more about this unusual book, see infra notes 198-99 and
accompanying text.
33. See Maguire, supra note 3 1 at7T 712.
34. Jan M. van Dunn6, "Normative and Narrative Coherence in Legal Decision Making" in Law andLegal
Interpretation, Fernando Atria and D. Neil MacCormick, eds. (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate/
Dartmouth, 2003), p. 409.
35. See, e.g., id.; Robin West, "Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal The-
ory", 6o New. U. L. Rev. 145, 159 (1985); Richard Weisberg, Poethics and Other Strategies ofLaw and
Literature (New York: Columbia University Press 1992); Jonathan Yovell, "Invisible Precedents: On the
Many Lives of Legal Stories Through Law and Popular Culture," 5o Emory LawJournal I265 (2oo0 ).
36. See West, supra note 35 at 159.
37. See Brendan F. Brown, The NaturalLaw Reader (New York: Oceana, 196o), p. 113.
38. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.195, quoted in
\West, supra note 35 at 48.
39. Id., at 187-88 (1957), quoted in West, supra note 40 at 48. These tropes recur continually in the narra-
tives urged by the defendants on the serial juries that heard the Hillmon case-the youth and purity of
their surrogate Walters as contrasted with the age, experience, and corruption of Hillmon. This was so
especially concerning teeth and scars: Hillmon's teeth were often described (by defendants' witnesses)
as rotten, his body as scarred.
40. See West, supra note 35 at 159.
41. British literary historian David Watson Rannie, in a slender 1895 book, proposed that letters as a liter-
ary form were distinguished from essays and autobiography by their candor and artlessness, in part
because they were not intended for publication. David Watson Rannie, Letter Writing as a form of Lit-
erature in Ancient and Modern Times (Oxford: B.H. Blackwell 1895), p. A2, ("the world will never pry
into the dual solitude in which [the letter] has its being").
42. See Yovell, supra note 35.
43. See Maguire, supra note 31; Eustace Seligman, "An Exception to the Hearsay Rule," 263 Harvard Law
Review 146 (1913); James W. Payne, Jr., "The Hillmon Case-An Old Problem Revisited," 41 Virginia
Law Review loll (1955).
44. Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
45. For example, in the advisory committee's note after Fed. R. Evid. 8o 4 (b)( 3), the Committee rejected
the rule of Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913) (statement against penal interest is not an
exception to the hearsay rule, even if declarant is unavailable).
46. See Maguire, supra note 3 1.
47. Annual Report of the Kansas State Superintendent of Insurance, reproduced in John H. Wigmore, The
Principles ofJudicialProof(Boston: Little, Brown, 1913), pp. 856-896 [hereinafter Annual Report].
48. See Maccracken, supra note 5 at 50.
49- Id., at 75-
50. Maccracken is not alone in harboring little skepticism of this report or its source. A British scholar who
investigated the case opines that "no impartial reader can fail to be persuaded by the account of the facts
retailed by Wigmore that the body presented was not that of Hillmon, but that of one Walters." Colin
Tapper, "Hillmon Rediscovered and Lord St. Leonards Resurrected," 106 L.Q.Rev. 441, 459-60
(i99o). Professor Tapper concedes that Wigmore's account was "taken from a report by a Kansas State
Insurance Commissioner who.., admittedly [represented] the defendants," but credits the author as
"meticulous in separating fact from opinion." Id., at 72. Wigmore's account is in fact nothing but a ver-
batim replication of the "Superintendent's Report."
51. Wigmore gives the date of the report as 1887, but this cannot be correct, as the report says on its first
page, "The cases are now (April 1888) in the Circuit Court pending the argument of a motion for new
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trial. If this motion is overruled, an appeal will probably be taken to the United States Supreme Court."
(parenthetical material in original). See Annual Report, supra note 47, at 856-896.
52. Id., at 856 (Gleed lists himself as attorney for defendants on both second and third trials); see also id., at
884-87 (Gleed quotes at length from his own closing argument).
53. See Eighteenth Annual Report of the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of Kansas for the Year End-
ing December3l, 1887 (Topeka, Kansas Publishing House: Clifford C. Baker, State Printer, 1888),
PP. 49-74- The report, otherwise a rather dry compendium of statistics and encomia, contains only
one other similar narrative, an account of a dispute over whether the daughter of Nannie C. Poinsett
ought to be barred from receiving the proceeds of insurance on her mother's life because she had poi-
soned the lady with arsenic. The attorneys for the insurance companies in that dispute, which was
tried only once and resulted in a verdict for the daughter, included Barker, Green, and Gleed, but the
account of it was not written by any of the attorneys. The narrator, one Charles M. Foster (connec-
tion to the matter undisclosed), relates that one witness changed his testimony, and then changed it
back again, claiming at one point that he had been pressured by attorneys for the Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company of New York-one of whom was J.W. Green, but another of whom was C.W.
Hutchings, who was still at that time and for many years thereafter attorney for Sallie Hillmon in her
suit against the same company.
54. John H. Wigmore, The Principles ofJudicialProof(Boston: Little, Brown, 1913), p. 856.
55. See Annual Report, supra note 47 at 857.
56. See "Photograph Palaver," Leavenworth Times, June 27, 1882, at i (first trial) (George Baldridge testi-
fies that he took a stenographic record of the inquest at the request of Maj. Wiseman, but "never fur-
nished either the coroner or county clerk a copy of the testimony.")
57. See "The Hillman Horror," supra note io at l (testimony of Levi Baldwin).
58. Id., at 2; see also "The Hillmon Cases," Leavenworth Times, June 16, 1882, at i.
59. "A Long Story," Leavenworth Times, June 17, 1882, at i.
6o. Major Wiseman continued to be a useful agent for the companies throughout the next two decades of the
Hillmon litigation. He described his commission as "looking up evidence to prove that the body was not
Hillmon." "How Tall was He?" Topeka Daily Capital, Mar. 18, 1896, at 2. He had to confess with some
rue, at the fifth trial, that he had gone unpaid and had been required to sue his employers for the $25oo they
owed him for his services. Id. But he may have had his revenge for this mistreatment. See infra note 131.
61. Medicine Lodge Cresset, Apr. 3, 1879, at 2. This story remarks, of Colonel Walker, "The Col.'s fame in
early Kansas history is too well known to need any comment."
62. Id. At later proceedings, Major Wiseman and Mr. Tillingast would testify that they knew and said,
immediately on seeing the body, that it was not Hillmon's. See "How Tall was He?," supra note 6o at 2
(testimony of Major Wiseman). But this was not the Cresset reporter's impression.
63. She later said that the insurance company's men discouraged her from viewing the corpse; they denied
that they had, but another witness who had been with her on the occasion confirmed her account. See
"Coming to a Close,' Leavenworth Times, June 30, 1882, at 4 (testimony of Mrs. Judson).
64. See "The Hillman Horror," supra note so at i.
65. "The Hillman Trial," Topeka Daily Capital, Feb. i6, 1895, at 6.
66. Id., at 6.
67. "Wiseman Testifies," Topeka Daily Capital, Jan. 31, 1895, at 4.
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75- Id.
76. Id.
77. "Hillman Tragedy," Medicine Lodge Cresset, Apr. 17, 1879, at 2.
78. Id.





84. Another Lawrence newspaper had reported that, although not opposed to the inquiry "the people-very
many ofthem-do object to having the EXPENSE foisted offupon DOUGLAS COUNTY. The proceed-
ings here are instituted, we understand, by the Insurance companies who have $25,ooo at stake, and it is
claimed to be simply a matter of justice that they should foot the bills, instead of our overburthened taxpay-
ers." "The Hillman Inquest," Lawrence Daiy Traune, April 7, 1879, at 4. The taxpayers needn't have wor-
ried; as it turned out the companies were willing to pay everyone, including the wimesses and jurors. See
"Wiseman Testifies," supra note 67 at 4. And this gesture seemed to quell the objections of the Tribune's edi-
tors, as they suggested a few days later that citizen curiosity about the verdict of the coroner's jury was
"unseemly" as "[i]t is a private matter and hence we have no right to be too inquisitive; we do not pay the bills;
we do not encourage or justify the official action; we have no right to ask any questions." Id., at 4.
85. See "The Hillman Horror," supra note to at 2. The colorful juxtaposition of calcium light (a sort of
stage light or spotlight) and truth appears also in the otherwise very different coverage of the Medicine
Lodge newspaper, which proposes that the "light of calcium truth be permitted to shine through the
dark and infamous swindle which the Insurance companies propose to so coolly carry out." See "Hill-
man Tragedy," supra note 77 at 2.
86. See "The Hillman Horror," supra note to at 2.
87. Id.
88. Id. Has any corpse outside of horror fiction ever suffered more difficulty remaining in its grave?
89. See "Hillman Tragedy," supra note 77 at 2.
9
o
."Murder Will Out!", Lawrence Standard, Apr. 17, 1879, at 4-
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (Testimony of G.A. Stevens, Mrs. Turner Sampson, and Kitty C. Howe).
94. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.





98. "The Hillman Tragedy," Lawrence Standard, June 26, 1879, at 4.
99. See "Murder Will Out!" supra note go at 4. On April i, the other Lawrence newspaper reported a
"rumor" that "the body of the supposed Hillmon may prove to that of a man named Willey, who had
been with Hillmon and Brown a great deal. His home is in Illinois and he was last heard of some sixty
miles southwest of Wichita, about six weeks ago." "A Rumor," Lawrence Daily Tribune, Apr. it, 1879,
at 4. Willey's name does not seem to come up again, however.
too. This phrase is displayed in the newspaper column in the manner shown.
ioi. See "The Hillman Tragedy," supra note 98 at 4.
102. Much later the coroner testified that he had issued a warrant for Brown's arrest after the jury returned
its verdict, and that Mr. Green had assisted in its preparation. See "The Hillmon Trial," Topeka Daily
Capita, Feb. 16, 1895, at 6. But none of the contemporaneous reporting mentions this fact, and Green
himself, called as a witness twenty years later at the sixth trial, denied that he had ever issued a warrant
for Brown.. "Advised His Brother to Swear to a Lie," Leavenworth Times, Oct. 24, 1899, at 4.
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103. Hillmon's daybook or journal, a surprisingly literate document that says nothing about any plans to
kill a man (of course it wouldn't, no matter whom you believe) was found on the body at Crooked
Creek. See Annual Report, supra note 47 at 857-59.
104. See Brown affidavit, supra note 12 at 165.
1O5. Brown also wrote (not just signed, as with the affidavit) another highly helpful document: a letter to
Sallie Hillmon. He later would say that the letter was dictated to him by Buchan. "How It Happened,"
Leavenworth Times, June 20, 1882, at i. The letter said: "I would like to know where John is, and how
that business is, and what I should do, if anything. Let me know through my father. Yours truly, John
H. Brown." But Mrs. Hillmon testified that she did not receive this letter, Leavenworth Times, June si,
1885, at 4, and Buchan admitted that he did not send it on to her, See "How it Happened," supra note
1o5 at i; instead he gave it to the insurance companies' representatives. Apparently it was never
intended as an actual communication; it was a piece of evidence manufactured by Buchan, at a time he
purported to be representing Brown, in favor of the insurance companies' theory that Brown and Sallie
Hillmon were united in a continuing conspiracy.
io6. This was Brown's testimony at the first trial (the only one at which he appeared in person). "Brown's
Letter," Leavenworth Times, June 18, 1882, at 5. In addition, it was Mrs. Hillmon's consistent account.
See "How it Happened," surpa note 1O5 at i.
107. See Maccracken, supra note 5 at 53.
1o8. Id., at 53, 73.
io9. See Annual Report, supra note 47 at 873.
iso. Id., at 870; Maccracken, supra note 5 at 53. Certainly this was Buchan's claim, but the elder Brown was
never called to testify, by either side. The brothers Brown maintained that Buchan had approached
John Brown without invitation or authority.
iI.1 Id.
112. "Proceedings Before Judges Foster and Brewer The Hillman Case," Leavenworth Times, June 14,
1885, at 4 (second trial).
113. "A Long Story," Leavenworth Times, June 17, 1882, at i. Buchan acknowledged that the deputy
accompanied him on the drive over to Reuben Brown's place, but testified that his companion's
law enforcement credentials were mere coincidence; the sheriff's office just happened to have the
best team of horses around, and "little use for it." "That Tooth," Leavenworth Times, June 22,
1882, at 1.
114. See "A Long Story," supra note 113 at .
115. See "How it Happened," supra note 1o 5.
116. "The Hillman Case Still Going On," Leavenworth Times, June 12, 1885, at 4 (second trial). In the 1988
trial Buchan agreed that "Brown did not read [the affidavit] over." "Hillman the Murderer," Lawrence
Tribune, Mar. 16, 1888, at 2.
117. See "A Long Story," supra note 1 13 at i (John Brown); "How It Happened," Leavenworth Times, June
20, 1879, at s (Sallie Hillmon).
118. See "That Tooth," supra note 113 at .
119. See "A Long Story," supra note 113 at s. (first trial). He seemed willing by his account, however, to
have it shown to Sallie Hillmon as an inducement to abandon her claims.
120. See "That Tooth," supra note 113 at I.
121. Id.
122. "Vaccine Virus," Leavenworth Times, June 23, 1882, at i (testimony of J.R. Buchan).
123. See 1899 Transcript, supra note io at 166-67. See also "The Hillmon Case," Topeka Daily Capital,
Mar. 2, 1888, at4.
124. Id.
125. See "That Tooth," supra note 113 at 1.
126. "Brown's Confession," Topeka Daily Capital, Mar. so, 1888, at 4 (second trial). See Supra n.1o 5.
127. Id.
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128. Id. Buchan testified that Brown's insistence on immunity not only for himself but for his partner as well
complicated the negotiations, and of course if true this would suggest that Brown knew Hillmon was
still alive; but Brown's testimony was different.
129. Brown's deposition describes Buchan's importunings thus: "[B]y me consenting to do this would
insure me that I would never have any trouble about it from that time on, and if I didn't the insurance
men would hunt me down and penitentiary me for murder, and that they had plenty of money, and
never calculated to paying the woman her money, and it would enable him to get big pay for this paper,
and that if I needed any money or anything he would give me all I wanted." See Brown Deposition, in
1899 Transcript, supra note io at 401(hereinafter Brown deposition).
13o. Brown's deposition testimony claimed that "After I told him [Buchan] of this man that camped with us
at Cow Skin, then he said he could make it appear that this man was killed instead of Hillmon, and
stated in his paper [the affidavit] to this effect." Id., at 401.
131. "Brother and Sister Swear It Was Walters," Leavenworth Times, Nov. i1, 1899, at 6. Apparendy, by the
end of the last trial the defendants had more or less given up the claim that Frederick Adolph Walters was
the "Joe Burgess" of Browns' affidavit. One of their own attorneys elicited from Major Wiseman that he
had "found" both Francis (Frank) Nichols and Joe Burgess in 1879. Id. But perhaps they knew that if they
did not bring out this fact, plaintiff's counsel would have. Wiseman's belated willingness to help Sallie
Hillmon may have been connected to his testimony in the fifth trial that the companies had not paid him
for his services and he had been required to sue them. See "How Tall Was He,' supra note 6o at 2.
132. See infra note 166-68 and accompanying text.
133. "Was It Walters?", Leavenworth Times, June 29, 1882, at 4.
134- Id.
135. "Foster's Findings," Leavenworth Times, July z, I882, at 5.
136. "The Hillmon Cases," Leavenworth Times, July 4, 1882, at 2.
137. "Proceedings Before Judges Brewer and Foster-the Hillman Case," Leavenworth Times, June 18,
1885, at 4.
138. "The Hillman Case," Leavenworth Times, June 19, 1885, at i. The press account spells her surname
"Reivnoeck."
139. "The Hillman Trial," Leavenworth Times, June 25, 1885, at 4.
140. Id. (capitalization in original).
141. Id.
142. See "Was It Walters?," supra note 133.at 4.
143- Id., at 4; 1888 Transcript, supra note jo at 19o-91. Rieffenach did not appear in person at this trial. Her
deposition was taken in 188o. See 1899 Transcript, supra note io at 1778.
144. See 1888 Transcript, supra note to at 189-9o.
145. "A Verdict at Last," Topeka Daily Capital, Mar. 22, 1888, at 4.
146. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text
147. "The Hillmon Case," Topeka Daily Capital, Feb.i, 1895, at 8. The blow-by-blow accounts of the inquest
and accompanying events in Lawrence by a reporter who obviously favored the insurance companies
made no mention of this event in 1879, although it seems that it would have been well-remarked at the
time had it happened. When Alva Baldwin finally appeared as a live witness, at the sixth trial, he firmly
denied having made the exclamation. "Mysterious Silence of Alva Baldwin Broken," Leavenworth Times,
Oct. 26, 1899, at 4.
148. See "The Hillmon Case,' supra note 147 at 5; "Hillmon Trial Again Resumed," Topeka Daily Capital,
Feb. 6, 1895, at4.
149. Leavenworth Standard, Apr. lo, 1879 at 1.
15o. "Say It Was Not J.W. Hillmon," Topeka Daily Capital, Feb. 2, 1895, at 5; See "Hillmon Trial Again
Resumed," supra note 148 at 4.
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151. See "The Hillman Horror," supra note io at i.
152. "Walters' Sister," Topeka Daily Capital, Feb. 24, 1895, at 2.
153. "Goes Right Along," Topeka Daily Capital, Feb. 23, 1895, at 5.
154. Id.
155. "Eleven to One," Topeka Daily Capital, Mar. 21, 1895, at 6.
156. Id., at 5.
157. See 1899 Transcript, supra note io at 1794.
i58. "Same Old Result," Topeka Daily Capital, Apr. 4, 1896, at i. The Capital reported that the last poll
taken of the jurors was seven to five, although one juror later claimed they had been evenly divided. It
also reported that the jurors had thereafter agreed to some sort of numerical system to calculate the
weight of evidence on each side by assigning a value from zero to five for each witness. On this system,
the Capital's source said, the insurance companies were far ahead until one holdout juror refused to
vote according to this system, and this defection caused the foreman to inform the judge that they were
at an impasse. The paper also reported that the insurance companies had proposed to the Hillmon side,
after this outcome, to "try the case before the five federal judges who have tried the case and abide by
the decision of the majority." Id. This proposal did not, it seems, meet with agreement.
159. See 1899 Transcript, supra note io at 1790-94.
16o. See "Brother and Sister Swear It Was Walters," supra note 131 at 6.
16i. J.W. Green explicitly noted the plaintiff's failure to contest the identity of the handwriting in his sum-
mation. "Simmons Testimony a Footless Fancy," Leavenworth Times, Nov. 17, 1899, at 4.
162. This itinerary is remarkably similar to the list of cities given by Miss Alvina Kasten when she was asked
in her deposition from whence she had received letters from Walters. See 1899 Transcript, supra note
io at 1693. These letters were never produced because (Kasten said) she had destroyed all of Walters'
letters except for the crucial one. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
163. See "Brother and Sister Swear It Was Walters," supra note 131 and accompanying text.
164. Typewritten partial transcript of 1899 trial, page marked 668 (NARA Archive).
165. "Gives Her $33,102," Leavenworth Times, Nov. 19, 1899, at 4. The New York Life Insurance Company
had paid Sallie Hillmon Smith's claim before the sixth trial commenced. See Lawrence Evening Standard,
Oct. i5, 1899, at 4. Mutual of New York paid the judgment against it from the sixth trial. See Satisfac-
tion in Full of Judgment, August 8, i9oo (NARA Archive). But the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance
Company again appealed. A Circuit Court of Appeals having been created since the previous appeal, the
appeal was first argued and decided there, in favor of affirmance. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon,
107 F. 834 (1901). Certiorari review was granted by the United States Supreme Court, with the same
result as a decade earlier: the Court overturned Mrs. Hillmon's victory and remanded the matter for a
new trial. On this occasion the bases for reversal were again issues pertaining to the law of evidence.
The Court held that John Brown's affidavit, introduced by Mrs. Hillmon for the limited purpose of
showing why she had at one time said she would release the defendants from her claims, should have
been received as the truth of the matters it recited and the jury so instructed. It also held that certain
statements that witnesses claimed Levi Baldwin had made about a scheme he and John Hillmon had
conceived, a scheme that Baldwin said would make him rich, were admissible against Mrs. Hillmon as
co-conspirator's statements. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 188 U.S. 208 (1903). Before the case
could be tried for a seventh time, the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company settled Mrs. Hill-
mon's claim.
i66. Or possibly "ranch." See Transcript 1899, supra note io at 1689. Concerning originals and copies of
this letter, see infra note 192.
167. See Brown Affidavit, supra note i2 at 165.
68. It may be speculated that Walters actually wrote the letter on the trail after meeting Hillmon and
Brown, then handed it off to a traveler going the opposite direction, back toward Wichita, asking
him to post it from there. But in such a case why would he not say so, instead of heading the letter
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"Wichita"? Moreover, immediately after inscribing this heading the letter writer states that he "will
stay here until the fore part of next week & then will leave here" (with Hillmon). The letter was
dated March i, 1879, and postmarked March 2nd, a Sunday. If the writer had kept with his intentions
(that's the idea of the hearsay exception, isn't it?) he could not have left Wichita until after the letter
mentioning Hillmon's name was posted from there, and so could not have met Hillmon for the first
time on the trail.
169. See "Brother and Sister Swear It Was Walters," supra note 131.
i7o. See supra note io5.
171. See text accompanying supra notes 148-15i.
172. See "The Hillman Horror," supra note io at z (testimony of Dr. Miller). This testimony was offered
again at each of the trials to explain why the doctor's form had j'9" written over an erased earlier entry
(other forms said 5'11 "). See, e.g., "W.J. Buchan Tells of J.H. Brown's Statement," Leavenworth Times,
Nov. 3, 1899, at 6. But why would Hillmon have done such a thing, even if he were planning the scheme
the defendants attributed to him? Surely he knew his own height, and he could not have known, before
leaving home, what height his victim would be.
It also seems nearly certain that the testimony of Seeley in the fifth trial was perjured, but it is less
clear that the attorneys knew that this was the case, as the letter that proved him false was not discov-
ered until some time shortly before the sixth and last trial. Defense counsel wisely did not call Seeley
in the sixth trial.
173- J.W. Green was still arguing this proposition in his opening statement in the last trial, twenty years
after he certainly had learned that it could not be true. "By Conspiracy," Leavenworth Times, Oct. 18,
1899, at 4 ("The man who was buried at Lawrence was Walters. He was the man who accompanied
Hillmon and Brown west from Wichita with the promise of a position on a sheep ranch.").
174. "Proceedings Before Judges Foster and Brewer The Hillman Case," Leavenworth Times, June 14,
1885, at 4.
175. Toward the end of this trial it printed a story expressing the sentiment that "where there is such a well-
grounded suspicion as there is in this case, the quicker such cases are thrown out of court the better, and
the sooner the attempts to defraud insurance companies will be stopped." "The Hillman Case," Leav-
enworth Times, June 26, 1885, at 2.
176. A curious piece of evidence offered by the defendants at the last trial, but excluded by the judge (per-
haps on hearsay grounds), showed that the Walters family had erected a gravestone in the family cem-
etery plot inscribed "Frederick Adolph Walters, born January 25th, i855, died March 17,1879. Interred
at Lawrence, Kansas." See 1899 Transcript, supra note io at 1799.
177. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
178. See "Brother and Sister Swear It Was Walters," supra note 131 at 6.
179. See 1899 Transcript, supra note soat 1687. She balked at specifyingwhether they were engaged, saying
it was nobody's concern but theirs, but did agree that the two had exchanged rings around December
of 1877. Id., at 1691.
i8o. Id., at 1696. The deposition, like this paragraph, alternates between "Walter" and "Walters" as the
family name.
181. Nor did Mrs. Hillmon's attorneys, of course, but unlike defense counsel they had few resources avail-
able to assist in any such persuasion. In any event, it does not seem to have occurred to Mrs. Hillmon's
lawyers that the Kasten letter was not authentic.
182. Id., at 1694.
183. Id. At first she said she had destroyed the letters shortly after giving the Wichita letter to Tillinghast;
on further questioning she said it had been a year later than that, which would have been only shortly
before giving the deposition. She appears, from the transcript, to have been flustered by the question-
ing, explaining her lapses by saying she was "bothered" (worried, presumably) about her sister, who
was ill.
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184. "Mrs. Hillmon's Evidence to be Finished Today," Leavenworth Times, Oct. 25, 1899, at 4.
185. "Claims Walters Was In Leavenworth In May 1879," Leavenworth Times, Nov, 14, 1899, at 4.
186. After the evidence had closed at the last trial, but before the jury was instructed, the Hillmon attorneys
asked leave to reopen the case for the testimony of a newly-discovered witness, T.S. Cookson, who
was said to be a co-employee who remembered F.A. Walters working at the Simmons cigar factory
during the dates testified to by Simmons. The court denied the motion to reopen. "Ready for Argu-
ments in the Hillmon Case," Leavenworth Times, Nov. 15, 1899, at 4.
No aspersion was ever cast on the character of Simmons, at least not in the courtroom. The last-
minute timing of his testimony may have made a search for impeachment material hopeless, but years
later, reporting retrospectively on the case, the Topeka Capital characterized Simmons as "one of the
oldest and most substantial cigar manufacturers in Leavenworth." "Hillmon Case is Done For,"
Topeka Daily Capital, July 5, 1903, at 5.
187. It is true that there was also evidence, in various of the Hillmon trials, of sightings of Hillmon after his
claimed death at Crooked Creek. But none of these identifications was supported by any documentary
or corroborative evidence, and most if not all were highly implausible on their face.
188. See "Claims Walters Was In Leavenworth In May 1879," supra note 185 at 4.
189. Id.
19o. Id.
191. See "How it Happened," supra note 1O5.
192. 1 t would be an excellent exercise to compare the handwriting on the Kasten letter to that of other letters
written by young Walters, but the original of the Kasten letter is not to be found; in its stead, in the
archives of the National Archives and Records Administration, is a copy (marked "Copy")-hand-
written, for facsimile copies were unknown in those days. The original (also handwritten) deposition
transcript is there; but the copied letter appears to have been substituted for the original "Exhibit C,"
which would in the ordinary course have been appended to the deposition. The handwritten copy is
rather obviously not written in the distinctive elegant copperplate of the notary who recorded the dep-
osition. But at the end of the copy appears this notation: "Received June 24, 1881 a letter of which the
above is a true copy," and below this is a signature: J.W. Green, Arty. For Deft."
193. See the examples in The New Herst-Sampson Catalog: Kenneth L. Gilman ed., 4 Guide to i9th Cen-
tury United States Postmarks and Cancellations (North Miami: David G. Phillips Pub. Co., 1989) (copy
available from author).
194. E.g., "What's the Verdict?", Topeka Daily Capital, Apr. i, 1896, at 2 (summation of defendants' attor-
ney Isham).
195. See Brown Affidavit, supra note 12 at 46o. It seems indisputable that John Hillmon paid
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